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Abstract 
When we produce an action we generate predictions about the sensory 
consequences that are likely to ensue. This thesis tests a series of claims about 
the functional contribution these predictions make to perception, the role that 
such predictions play in processing the reactions of others, and the range of 
sensory inputs that these prediction mechanisms operate over. Chapter 1 
outlines the theoretical background to each of these claims, alongside the 
previous literature that motivates subsequent experiments. 
The first three empirical chapters focus on claims about the functional role of 
sensory predictions during action: that they act to ‘cancel’ perception of 
expected action outcomes. Chapter 2 investigates this hypothesis in the context 
an intensity judgement task, Chapter 3 tests the hypothesis in the context of a 
signal detection task and Chapter 4 assess how predictions generated during 
action influence multivariate measures of visual brain activity, recorded via 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
Chapter 5 investigates the claim that sensory predictions during action support 
the processing of imitative reactions in others. Two psychophysical 
experiments are reported which investigate whether sensory predictions 
generated during action have temporal properties needed to support 
processing of others’ reactions. 
Chapter 6 investigates whether sensory predictions generated during action 
influence the ‘when’ - as well as the ‘what’ - of perception. Four psychophysical 
experiments investigate whether the temporal features of executed actions are 
incorporated into duration perception. Chapters 7 and 8 report preliminary 
investigations into the mechanism underlying these effects. Chapter 7 assesses 
whether these influences arise through a mechanism that is primarily tuned to 
biological action outcomes. Chapter 8 investigates whether these effects arise as 
a result of statistical learning about the relationship between actions and 
outcomes.  
Chapter 9 summarises the studies presented in the thesis, and outlines their 
implications for thinking about sensory prediction during action. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with two developments in psychology, and the 
relationship between them. First, the idea that expectations exert a top-down 
influence on perceptual processing has gained traction across cognitive science. 
A range of theoretical and empirical work challenges the old orthodoxy that 
what we perceive is driven in a purely ‘bottom-up’ fashion. Following a 
venerable tradition (Helmholtz, 1860), it is instead argued that perception 
unfolds through the combination of inherently ambiguous sensory evidence 
with prior knowledge of the environment in which we find ourselves.  In recent 
decades, this predictive processing approach has been supported by a range of 
behavioural and neural data showing that perceptual judgements – and the 
neural mechanisms supporting them – are influenced by expectations (Clark, 
2013). 
Second, there is a growing appreciation of the interactions between perception 
and action. The classical division of labour in experimental psychology assumed 
that perception and action proceeded largely independently of one another, 
with the motor system serving solely as the output buffer for other cognitive 
processes occurring ‘upstream’ (Neisser, 1967). This division has been 
undermined by a large body of work that has revealed that perceptual and 
motor processes interact to optimise both the control of action and our 
representation of the sensory world.  
These separate theoretical developments – that expectations and actions 
influence perception – may seem superficially similar; both suggest that 
perception does not proceed purely in a bottom-up fashion, but is instead 
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shaped by other sources of top-down information. However there are 
significant contrasts between theories developed to explain how action 
predictions influences perception and those developed more generally to 
account for effects that expectations have on perceptual performance. Given 
these contrasts, this thesis therefore first investigates more closely the nature of 
the predictive mechanisms deployed during action and whether they really 
contrast with mechanisms deployed outside of action contexts. Specifically, it 
considers the claim that top-down motor predictions have a functionally 
dissociable influence on perceptual processing (functional-specificity).  
Second, using theoretical developments in both fields, it investigates the inputs 
over which motor predictions operate. It asks whether motor predictions 
influence our ability to process the actions of other agents as well as our own 
action effects (agent-specificity), and whether predictions generated during 
action influence both the ‘what’ and ‘when’ of perceptual estimates, 
investigating predictive motor contributions to time perception (modality-
specificity). This Introduction outlines the theoretical background to each of 
these strands, drawing out explicit comparisons between models developed in 
the action literature and those developed to account for predictive effects in 
other contexts. The Introduction closes with an outline of how the identified 
open questions are investigated in the empirical chapters that follow.  
1.1.  What are ‘top-down effects’ and ‘expectations’? 
This thesis examines both theories developed to explain top-down predictive 
motor contributions to perception and those developed in sensory cognition 
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that aim to account for influences of top-down expectations on perceptual 
processing in general. I will begin by explaining what is meant by the terms ‘top-
down’ and ‘expectations’ in the context of this thesis. 
Psychologists tend to describe influences as ‘top-down’ when the operation of a 
psychological process is shaped by prior knowledge. This is contrasted with 
‘bottom-up’ processes which are driven primarily by current input (Eysenck, 
1998). While the distinction between top-down and bottom-up processes partly 
reflects a traditional view on information processing – with simpler sensory 
input mechanisms receiving input at the ‘bottom’ that is passed to higher-order 
functions at the ‘top’ – it is also influenced by how neuroscientists have 
described the hierarchical organisation of functions in the cortex (e.g. Mechelli, 
Price, Noppeney, & Friston, 2003). Indeed recent theoretical work describing 
the functional cytoarchitecture of the cortex describes ‘top-down’ effects as 
influences which are mediated by descending neural projections into deep 
cortical layers of ‘lower’ brain areas and ‘bottom-up’ effects are those which are 
mediated by ascending neural projections into the superficial cortical layers of 
‘higher’ brain areas (Friston, 2005). However, the psychological distinction 
between top-down and bottom-up effects is not at heart about which kind of 
neural projection mediates the influence, and it is in the psychological sense – of 
prior information influencing processing of current input (Shea, 2015) – that 
the term is used throughout this thesis. 
Top-down effects of this kind have been the focus of considerable theoretical 
and empirical work in sensory cognition, with researchers distinguishing 
different top-down effects based on the kinds of representation that shape 
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perceptual processing. For example, Summerfield and Egner (2009; 2016) 
distinguish effects of top-down expectation from top-down attention: 
expectation effects are driven by representations of what is likely to occur (e.g. 
a statistical association) whereas attentional effects are driven by 
representations about what is relevant in a given environment (e.g. task goals). 
These definitions of ‘top-down’ and ‘expectation’ (the latter of which is used 
synonymously with ‘prediction’) are used in the present thesis. Importantly, the 
definition thus drawn often excludes effects on perceptual processing caused by 
the structure of the body and brain - which some consider to be ‘expectations’ 
acquired over the course of evolution (Plotkin, 1997). 
With these definitions in mind we turn to the specific ways that sensory 
predictions generated by the motor system have been hypothesised to operate, 
and where this contrasts with models developed to explain top-down influences 
of expectation general. 
1.2. Functional-specificity: Do sensory predictions during action 
influence perception in a special way?  
It has been appreciated for some time that effective action control depends on 
anticipating the consequences of our movements (James, 1890). However, while 
the role of sensory prediction in action selection and execution is well-
established (Greenwald, 1970; Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 
2001), in recent decades interest has developed in how predictions generated 
by the motor system influence the perception of action outcomes. This section 
outlines the predominant model used to explain perceptual prediction during 
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action (the Cancellation model – Section 1.2.1), and will contrast this model 
with those used to describe effects of prediction outside of action (Section 
1.2.2). It will then describe an alternative ‘domain-general’ account (the 
OPPOSE model) which is consistent with both literatures but does not assume a 
special role for motor prediction (Section 1.2.4). 
1.2.1. Prediction during action ‘cancels’ perception of expected outcomes 
Research into sensory prediction during action has largely followed the 
Cancellation model proposed by Wolpert and colleagues (Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 2000; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). Under this model, when 
an action is initiated a forward model of the motor system predicts the sensory 
consequences that the movement will produce. These predictions are sent to 
sensory brain regions, and are subtracted from the sampled input (i.e. expected 
sensory units are suppressed; Bays & Wolpert, 2007), leading to attenuated 
perception of expected action outcomes. It is argued that such a ‘cancellation’ 
mechanism is functionally adaptive, as it allows actors to process preferentially 
unexpected events that are more likely to require learning or a novel response. 
For example, if when lifting a cup of coffee actors attenuate processing of 
expected sensory input (e.g. touch on the finger tips, sight of the moving cup) 
relative to unexpected input (e.g. sight of spilling coffee), they will be better 
placed to perform corrective actions to avoid spillage or learn about the 
dynamics of the sensory environment (e.g. perhaps the cup is lighter than 
anticipated).  
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The Cancellation model provides an explanation for the observation that it is 
difficult to tickle oneself (Weiskrantz, Elliott, & Darlington, 1971), and has 
drawn support from a range of behavioural studies that show events 
predictable on the basis of an executed action are perceived as less intense. For 
example, participants rate self-produced brushing sensations as less ticklish 
than those produced by a robot (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999) and self-
produced taps are rated as less intense than equivalent forces produced by a 
machine (Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005). Similar effects are seen outside of 
tactile domains; Weiss, Herwig and Schütz-Bosbach, (2011) report that self-
produced tones appear quieter than those produced by an experimenter, while 
dot motion congruent with a keypress appears slower than motion in an 
incongruent direction (Dewey & Carr, 2013). Signal detection tasks have also 
suggested that observers are less sensitive to low contrast arrows and Gabor 
patches when their orientations are congruent with an executed action 
(Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2010; Müsseler & 
Hommel, 1997a; 1997b).  
The Cancellation model has also drawn support from neuroimaging studies that 
find predictable action outcomes are associated with reduced activity in 
sensory brain regions. In touch, self-produced tactile sensations elicit reduced 
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses in secondary 
somatosensory cortex when compared to externally-produced sensations 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Shergill et al., 2013; 2014), while in vision 
Stanley and Miall (2007) find attenuated BOLD responses in primary visual 
cortex (V1) when participants observe gestures congruent with those they are 
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executing. Similar attenuation effects are seen in higher visual brain areas 
implicated in action perception (such as the superior temporal sulcus) when 
participants view actions congruent with their own movements (Kontaris, 
Wiggett, & Downing, 2009; Leube et al., 2003). In all cases, effects are 
interpreted as evidence for a ‘cancellation’ mechanism – with sensory 
predictions acting to suppress expected sensory inputs (Bays & Wolpert, 2007). 
1.2.2. Prediction outside of action facilitates perception of expected outcomes 
The influence that motor predictions are hypothesised to exert on perceptual 
processing contrasts with the functional role assigned to prediction by sensory 
cognition models outside of action. Following Helmholtz (1860), a number of 
theorists have emphasised that the sensory environment is inherently noisy, 
and that the patterns of stimulation that impinge on sensory receptors are 
insufficient to form reliable estimates of the outside world. This problem can be 
finessed by incorporating prior expectations into our perceptual estimates 
(Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). For example, when walking in heavy fog we 
may see ambiguous figures in the distance. Knowledge of our sensory context 
(e.g. that we are in a remote forest or an urban car park) is hypothesised to 
furnish our perceptual systems with expectations about likely features of the 
environment (e.g. that we can expect to encounter trees or cars, respectively) 
that aid interpretation of the ambiguous input, such that we are more likely to 
perceive what we expect. It is argued to be adaptive to bias perception in line 
with our expectations, as expected sensory events are by definition more likely 
to occur.  
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The idea that perception is formed as a synthesis between sensory evidence and 
expectations is the key claim of ‘Bayesian Brain’ approaches, which argue that 
human observers combine prior knowledge and sampled evidence in a manner 
that approximates the norms of Bayesian inference (Yuille & Kersten, 2006). 
Hierarchical predictive coding (Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999) - a 
particularly influential form of the Bayesian Brain hypothesis - suggests that the 
brain attempts to create a generative model of its environment by predicting 
the activity of neural populations at lower levels of the processing hierarchy 
(e.g. projections from V2 predict the activation of populations in V1) and 
passing back prediction errors to refine subsequent predictions. However, 
irrespective of the particular implementation of predictive processing to which 
one subscribes, it is typically assumed that expectations are incorporated into 
and improve perception. In other words, we are more, rather than less likely, to 
perceive what we expect - in contrast with Cancellation models in action.  
This idea draws support from studies which show valid expectations have a 
facilitatory influence on perceptual performance (Bar, 2004). Detection studies 
show that participants are more accurate when detecting stimuli that are 
congruent with expectations. For instance, Sekuler and Ball (1977) found that 
participants were better able to detect visual motion when the stimulus was 
compatible with a probabilistic cue, while Palmer (1975) reports that 
presenting observers with a particular sensory context (e.g. a kitchen) leads to 
more accurate detection of objects one would likely encounter within it (e.g. a 
loaf of bread). Studies using continuous flash suppression have also revealed 
that expectations can accelerate the entry of predicted stimuli into conscious 
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awareness (Pinto, van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 2015). Recent evidence 
also suggests that expected stimuli may appear phenomenally more intense. 
Han and VanRullen (2016) report that the apparent luminance of a grey disk is 
increased when it appears in the context of a three dimensional shape 
compared to the context of a random lines. Moreover a number of well-known 
illusions can also be explained as biases induced by prior knowledge. For 
example, in the hollow face illusion, participants are likely to perceive a concave 
face as convex, which may reflect the fact that convex faces are a much more 
frequent (and therefore more probable) feature of the environment (Gregory, 
1970).  
It is worth noting that both in the action and sensory cognition literatures, 
‘expectation’ is manipulated in a variety of ways. Typically in the action 
literature, ‘expected’ sensory outcomes are those which are ‘congruent’ with 
action – i.e., matching action outcomes such as seeing an index finger move 
when one is moving one’s index finger. Congruent events are by their nature 
likely to be expected given that they are the conditionally most probable 
consequence of a given movement (Shea, 2015), and agents have typically had 
vast amount of experience of these contingencies when learning to control their 
own actions (e.g. Rochat, 1998). Similar types of manipulation  - where 
expectations are assumed to have been generated on the basis of a contingency 
experienced outside the lab - are sometimes seen in the sensory cognition 
literature, e.g., where bread is more probable in the context of a kitchen 
(Palmer, 1975) or where shapes are probable than random lines (Han & 
VanRullen, 2016). However, sensory cognition studies also often introduce new 
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correlations between arbitrary events (e.g. where the frequency of an auditory 
tone predicts the orientation of a Gabor patch or a direction of dot motion; (Kok, 
Brouwer, van Gerven, & de Lange, 2013; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012) that 
allows participants to develop expectations over the course of an experiment. 
This thesis assumes that congruency effects that exploit expectations acquired 
over a lifetime’s experience and expectation effects acquired as a result of 
recent laboratory learning reflect the operation of similar processes. Indeed, the 
logic of the present thesis assumes that congruent events are indeed more 
expected than incongruent events and this assumption appears 
uncontroversial. However, the broader implications of this assumption are 
considered in greater detail in Section 9.3. 
Interestingly, fMRI studies looking  at the effect of prediction on perceptual 
processing find that events predictable on the basis of a contextual cue are 
associated with reduced BOLD activity in sensory brain areas (Alink, 
Schwiedrzik, Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2010), mirroring effects that have been 
reported to support the Cancellation action models (e.g. Blakemore et al., 1998). 
However, these reductions in univariate BOLD activity are not typically argued 
to reflect a suppression of expected sensory signals, but a sharpening of 
population responses. For example Kok, Jehee and de Lange (2012) used fMRI 
to investigate how expectations alter univariate and multivariate measures of 
visual brain activity.  The authors found that when the orientation of a grating 
was validly predicted by a prior probabilistic cue, univariate activity in early 
visual cortex was reduced (relative to trials with invalid cues). However, 
multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA) of the same data revealed superior 
26 
 
classification of stimulus orientation when expectations were valid. Such results 
– along with the behavioural findings of facilitatory influences of expectation in 
similar contexts – suggest that expectations act to enhance the quality of 
underlying sensory representations and that univariate reductions in signal do 
not reflect cancellation.  
There is thus a stark contrast between the theoretical models and empirical 
results relating to sensory prediction during action, and those relating to 
predictive influences outside of action contexts. On the one hand, a cancellation 
of events consistent with sensory predictions is argued to privilege the 
processing of unexpected events during action due to their behavioural 
relevance - evidenced by a range of studies revealing that predicted action 
outcomes appear less intense, and are harder to detect. On the other hand, 
theorists interested in expectation more generally emphasise the role of 
sensory prediction in privileging the processing of expected events, improving 
the reliability of our perceptual estimates by incorporating our prior 
knowledge. This is evidenced by a number of studies showing precisely the 
opposite effects – that predictable outcomes are easier to detect and appear as 
more intense. Arranged in this way, a functionally-specific explanation for 
motor predictions appears to provide the best account of the data. 
1.2.3. Sensory prediction during action facilitates perception of expected 
outcomes 
However, there are theoretical and empirical issues with this apparent disjunct 
between prediction during action and prediction of other kinds. Theoretically, it 
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is not clear that the adaptive arguments apply differently in action and non-
action contexts. In principle, it is just as important in both types of context to be 
sensitive to expected and unexpected outcomes. To use the previous example, if 
an observer in a remote forest comes across a parked car (an unexpected event) 
it is still adaptive to devote resources that will promote learning or planning a 
new course of action.  Comparably, if we are attempting to drink a cup of coffee 
in a noisy or ambiguous environment (e.g. a dark kitchen before sunrise) we 
will generate more veridical percepts of the ongoing action if we increase the 
weight given to expected sensory signals (e.g. the sight of the moving hand) 
over unexpected ones. 
Empirically, a number of findings also suggest that prediction during action may 
not influence the percept so differently from prediction in other contexts. For 
example, trained pianists are biased to hear an ambiguous sequence of rising or 
falling tones in line with  keypresses that typically produce either a rising or 
falling sequence (Repp & Knoblich, 2007), and participants are biased to report 
ambiguous clockwise/anticlockwise dot motion in line with a concurrent hand 
movement (Wohlschläger, 2000).  Related effects are obtained under binocular 
rivalry, where observed hand actions (Di Pace & Saracini, 2014) or rotating 
spheres (Maruya, Yang, & Blake, 2007) are more likely to dominate the 
observer’s percept when they are congruent with ongoing hand movements.  
Such results are reminiscent of those seen in predictive contexts outside of 
action e.g. in illusions where perception is biased toward expected outcomes 
(Gregory, 1970).  
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1.2.4. The OPPOSE model: Optimising Perception of Predicted Outcomes and 
Surprising Errors  
The results reviewed thus far suggest a paradox in the way that predictions 
generated during action influence perception. On the one hand, expected action 
outcomes are typically perceived as less intense than unexpected outcomes – 
consistent with the idea that predictions have been ‘cancelled’ from perception 
(Blakemore et al, 1998). On the other hand, predictions generated during action 
can bias ambiguous inputs towards expected outcomes (e.g. Wohlschläger, 
2000) – consistent with the idea that predicted sensory inputs are ‘facilitated’ 
by expectation, in line with models of predictive processing developed outside 
of action contexts. These latter findings suggest that contrast between 
prediction in action and non-action domains may not be as clear cut as 
previously assumed. 
It is possible to explain both facilitation and cancellation effects on perception 
without assuming the motor predictions operate differently from sensory 
predictions generated in other contexts. Recently Yon and Press (2017) 
suggested that both kinds of effect could be explained if it is assumed two 
processes optimise perception during action – one which increases the weight 
given to expected information, and another which is deployed when surprising 
errors are detected. Here this hypothesis is called the OPPOSE model 
(Optimising Perception of Predicted Outcomes and Surprising Errors).  Under 
the OPPOSE model a primary prediction process during action is hypothesised 
to operate identically to prediction mechanisms described in other areas of 
sensory cognition (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014; Yuille & Kersten, 2006).  
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Such a prediction mechanism would be expected to amplify expected sensory 
signals, accounting for findings where participants are biased towards 
perceiving (Wohlschläger, 2000) expected action outcomes. However, under 
this model it is assumed that when observers detect unexpected events during 
action (i.e. prediction errors), despite the primary mechanisms rendering such 
detection less likely than that of expected events, these outcomes subsequently 
become the target of secondary processes which facilitate the processing of 
surprising outcomes. These processes operate post-perceptually – i.e., following 
the perception of the surprising event. One candidate mechanism driving such a 
process is spatial attention, as eye-tracking paradigms have previously shown 
observers overtly attend to spatially or temporally surprising outcomes (Itti & 
Baldi, 2009). As spatial attention has been shown to increase apparent intensity 
(Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004), such an orienting mechanism would lead to a 
relative enhancement in the perceived intensity of unexpected action outcomes.  
These relative enhancements of unexpected events could generate cancellation 
effects – where expected action outcomes are perceived as relatively less 
intense (Blakemore et al., 1999; Weiss et al., 2011) in the absence of any 
process that actively suppresses expected inputs, or that operates before inputs 
are received. Under this OPPOSE model, it may therefore be possible to jointly 
optimise perception of events that are likely to occur and events that are likely 
relevant to behaviour due to their surprising nature.  
The OPPOSE models makes two predictions about the conditions under which 
action should facilitate perception of expected outcomes and when cancellation 
should occur. First, the prediction process necessarily precedes any process 
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that depends on prediction-error: therefore facilitation of expected action 
outcomes should be observed before later cancellation. This prediction was 
recently supported by the results of a visual task by Yon and Press (2017), 
where participants rated the intensity of congruent and incongruent action 
outcomes at different delays after movement: participants reported more 
intense percepts for congruent action outcomes when perception was probed 
50 ms after movement, while more intense percepts for incongruent action 
outcomes were observed at a 200 ms delay.  
The second prediction of the OPPOSE model is that the relative contribution of 
prediction and prediction-error mechanisms should depend on the strength of 
the sensory signal. In particular, cancellation effects are assumed to occur 
because surprising, unexpected events have been oriented towards – but an 
event cannot be surprising if it is not detected. Therefore when events are 
presented at threshold (as in signal detection experiments) experiments should 
generally find that predicted action outcomes are more readily detected, with 
less evidence of cancellation because unpredicted outcomes are not always 
detected. This prediction is not shared by cancellation theorists, who assume 
that predictions act to suppress sensory input directly and regardless of signal 
strength (Bays & Wolpert, 2007). However, a vast majority of studies looking at 
the influence of prediction during action have used suprathreshold stimuli and 
this prediction therefore remains largely untested. 
The hypothesis that prediction during action operates equivalently to other 
forms of prediction may also suggest an alternative interpretation of 
cancellation results at the neural level. As noted previously, the fact that tactile 
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(Blakemore et al., 1998; Shergill et al., 2013, 2014) and visual (Kontaris et al., 
2009; Leube et al., 2003; Stanley & Miall, 2007) brain activity is reduced for 
expected action events has been interpreted as evidence of cancellation. 
However, as described in Section 1.2.2, work looking at the effects of prediction 
outside of action has found that univariate reductions in BOLD signal can be 
accompanied by increases in multivariate classification accuracy – indicative of 
more informative underlying neural representations (Kok et al., 2012). To date 
similar multivariate measures have not been applied to the question of 
prediction during action, and therefore it is unclear whether the univariate 
reductions in sensory BOLD reported in previous studies reflect a suppression 
of expected input or a sharpening of underlying sensory representations. The 
former is predicted under the Cancellation model, though the latter would be 
found if motor prediction mechanisms operate equivalently to other kinds of 
prediction. 
1.2.5. Summary and open questions 
Influential models of motor prediction have suggested that expectations during 
action alter perception in the opposite fashion to that described by models of 
top-down prediction developed outside of action. However, current work is also 
consistent with a model where motor predictions operate equivalently to other 
kinds of prediction (the OPPOSE model; note that this model would be 
additionally expected to apply to prediction outside of action contexts). These 
models make a number of contrasting predictions. First, under Cancellation 
models, intensity judgements of suprathreshold stimulation should always be 
lower for events expected on the basis of action, relative to unexpected events. 
32 
 
However, as already outlined, the OPPOSE model predicts early high intensity 
judgements, followed by later low intensity judgements. These OPPOSE 
predictions were met in two experiments reported in Yon & Press (2017), and 
Chapter 2 presents an experiment that tests an alternative account of these 
effects (Experiment 3 in Yon & Press, 2017). Second, Cancellation models 
predict reduced detection of events expected on the basis of action, whereas the 
OPPOSE model predicts enhanced detection. These predictions are 
distinguished in Chapter 3. Finally, Cancellation models predict that the 
suppression of expected sensory signals will lead to reduced multivariate 
pattern classification of expected action outcomes, whereas the OPPOSE model 
predicts that expectations may ‘sharpen’ predicted signals, leading to superior 
multivariate pattern classification performance. These predictions are 
distinguished in Chapter 4.    
1.3. Agent-specificity: Do sensory predictions influence how we 
perceive the actions of others? 
Section 1.2 described the functional influence that prediction mechanisms 
during action exert on perceptual processes and considered whether this 
contrasts with the functional role assigned to prediction in other contexts. It 
therefore considers the domain-specificity of prediction mechanisms in action 
relative to predictions that operate based on other kinds of information (e.g. 
sensory context). The latter sections of this Introduction consider a different 
type of domain-specificity of prediction mechanisms during action – namely the 
range of inputs over which they operate. This section considers whether 
predictions during action only influence how we perceive our own action 
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outcomes, or whether they may also influence how we perceive the reactions of 
other agents.  
1.3.1. The role of sensory prediction during social interaction 
 A popular suggestion in recent decades has been that the motor system plays 
an important role in supporting social understanding and interaction by 
furnishing our ability to process the observed actions of others. A major 
impetus for theorising on this topic was the discovery of mirror neurons – a 
class of visuomotor units found in the ventral premotor and inferior parietal 
cortices of the macaque that respond both when the monkey executes an action, 
and when the monkey observes the same action performed by the experimenter 
(di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996).  
Different researchers have suggested that mirror populations in premotor areas 
are the neural instantiation of the ‘forward model’ hypothesised in predictive 
approaches to action control (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Miall, 2003; 
Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003), and it has been hypothesised that the models 
of our own action can therefore be repurposed to support social understanding. 
Indeed, there is considerable evidence in humans that homologous motor brain 
regions are activated during passive observation of others’ actions (Buccino et 
al., 2001; Oosterhof, Tipper, & Downing, 2013), with studies of neurological 
patients and ‘virtual lesions’ induced through transcranial magnetic stimulation 
suggesting that such motor activity makes a causal contribution to action 
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recognition (Pazzaglia, Smania, Corato, & Aglioti, 2008; Pobric & Hamilton, 
2006).   
However, independently of proposals that motor structures contribute to action 
understanding when we passively observe others, other researchers have 
suggested that predictions made during active movement may finesse social 
interactions (Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007; Wolpert et al., 2003). These models 
have emphasised the fact that when we interact with others (e.g. when we wave 
to a friend) the perceptual consequences of our own actions are similar to those 
generated by our social partners. Given this similarity, the same mechanisms 
that generate predictions about our own movements may be useful for 
perceiving the imitative reactions of others. Though comparatively little work 
has investigated these ideas, Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz (2007) have speculated 
this may be ‘the most important social function: it might render an individual 
selectively susceptible to similar actions of conspecifics’(p.354, emphasis added).  
1.3.2. Are our own sensorimotor models suited to the prediction of others’ 
actions? 
The assumption that the consequences of our actions are perceptually similar to 
the reactions of others might seem reasonable given the broad similarities 
between the morphology of human bodies and kinematics with which they 
move (e.g., Fitts, 1954). However, this assumption overlooks substantial 
differences between how the consequences of our own actions and the 
reactions of others are typically processed. In particular, when we produce an 
action (e.g. a wave) the sensory consequences produced are always matching (a 
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wave) and  occur at predictable delays in the order of milliseconds, while the 
reactions of others are only sometimes matching (imitative) and occur at 
variable delays after our own movements in the order of seconds. If predictive 
models of our own actions are to serve the hypothesised social functions 
(Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007), such models would need to generate 
predictions with sufficient generality across time (Kunde, Weller, & Pfister, 
2017). 
A handful of studies in the tactile domain examining the temporal precision of 
prediction during action suggest that predictions may not operate across such 
suprasecond delays. For example, predictive effects on perceived tactile force 
are seen when action execution and sensory outcomes are simultaneous, but 
are absent when delays of ~300 ms are imposed between action and outcomes 
(Bays et al., 2005). Such effects are interpreted to suggest that the underlying 
predictions are temporally-specific, and moreover this subsecond precision has 
been argued to be necessary if the predictions are to be useful in supporting the 
rapid detection of errors and the initiation of corrective actions (Wolpert et al., 
1995). However, we experience the reactions of others primarily through 
vision, and it is unclear whether visual predictions operate with the same 
subsecond tuning as described in touch, or whether they operate with a 
temporal profile that could support the prediction of others’ reactions.  
1.3.3. Summary and open questions 
Models advanced in the social cognition literature have suggested that 
predictive models of our own actions may be used for predicting similar 
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reactions of others – i.e., when we are imitated by a partner in social interaction. 
An important but untested assumption of these theories is that predictions 
generated during movement generalise across suprasecond delays, which may 
be difficult to reconcile with previous reports from the tactile domain that such 
mechanisms operate with subsecond precision. However, no work to date has 
directly considered this question within vision, and in Chapter 5 psychophysical 
experiments are reported which investigate whether predictive influences on 
visual intensity judgements are modulated by suprasecond action-effect delays.  
1.4. Modality-specificity: Do sensory predictions during action 
influence temporal features of perception? 
The previous section considered the generality of sensory predictions during 
action, describing how predictions may (or may not) generalise from our own 
actions to the reactions of others. The following section considers a different 
form of generality – namely whether predictive mechanisms influence when, as 
well as what, we perceive during action. A large body of work suggests that 
during movement we generate predictions about what will change in the 
environment – and that these expectations about the spatial properties or 
identity of outcomes influence perception. However, little work has considered 
whether predictions are also generated about the temporal features of action 
outcomes, such as when changes will occur and how they will evolve over time.  
The following section describes why such temporal integration could be 
adaptive (Section 1.4.1), before outlining different models of time perception 
that make contrasting predictions about the plausibility of such integration 
(Section 1.4.2.). 
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1.4.1. Predicting ‘when’ during action 
As already outlined in Section 1.2.2, sensory cognition models highlight how 
perceptual systems face a considerable challenge in generating accurate 
estimates of the environment from sensory inputs corrupted by noise. One 
strategy that an observer might use to deal with this uncertainty is to use top-
down information about the likelihood of different inputs. The adaptive 
argument outlined earlier applies equivalently to the temporal features of 
action and perception, which tend to be highly correlated. For example, when a 
cellist plays a note there is a strong correlation between the duration of the 
executed movement and the sensory consequences that are produced (duration 
of the produced note, duration of visual motion of the bow etc.) – and 
incorporating these predictive relationships into perception during action 
should generate more veridical estimates of time. However, while it is well-
known that action execution can influence the subjective passage of time 
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Merchant & Yarrow, 2016), it is not known 
whether the temporal features of movements are integrated into perceptual 
estimates in a comparable way to that which has previously been demonstrated 
for what information (e.g. where the perception of ambiguous rotating motion 
is biased towards concurrently executed hand rotations - Wohlschläger, 2000; 
see Section 1.2.3). 
1.4.2. Dedicated and intrinsic models of time perception 
The question of temporal integration between action and perception must 
necessarily consider some of the ongoing debates in the time perception 
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literature. In particular, there is ongoing controversy concerning whether time 
perception depends on mechanisms specifically dedicated to representing 
temporal information, or whether it arises as an intrinsic property of networks 
that represent other features (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). For example one 
‘dedicated’ timing model, the cerebellar timing hypothesis, suggests that 
duration information important for perception and action is represented by 
populations of interval timers akin to hourglasses – where particular event 
durations activate specific representations (Ivry, 1996). In contrast, ‘intrinsic’ 
timing models, such as those offered by Buonomano and colleagues 
(Buonomano, 2000; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007) assume that time is not 
explicitly represented but arises as a property of neural processing dynamics in 
modality-specific brain regions. These models suggest for example that the 
duration of a visual stimulus presentation leads to characteristic changes in the 
spatial distribution of visual activity, and that judgements about the duration of 
a stimulus are made by learning to recognise these characteristic changes – not 
by accessing a metric of time. 
Though these models differ in many respects, an important distinction between 
dedicated and intrinsic models of time is the possibility of interactions in time 
perception across modalities. Under dedicated models, information about event 
duration in different modalities is represented explicitly and can therefore be 
combined. In contrast, under intrinsic models there are no temporal 
representations per se, and the information used to make temporal judgements 
differ considerably across modalities, precluding integration (Ivry & Schlerf, 
2008).  
39 
 
However, little work has considered whether temporal features are integrated 
online in a comparable fashion to spatial features in the sensorimotor tasks 
described above (Section 1.2.3) – that is, it is unknown whether time perception 
in one modality is biased by expectations established through another modality, 
such as action. While such integration could be adaptive and may be possible 
under dedicated timing models, intrinsic models of time perception predict that 
such interactions should not occur. 
1.4.3. Summary and open questions 
A number of experiments suggest that spatial and identity features of 
perception (‘what’ information) are influenced by action, and these effects can 
be explained through a predictive process – where perceptual estimates are 
biased towards expectations established through movement. Considerably less 
attention has been paid to whether temporal features of perception (‘when’ 
information) are similarly influenced by action. While a biasing of time 
perception in line with expectations during action may be adaptive, existing 
models of time perception make divergent predictions about whether temporal 
features of action could be integrated into perceptual estimates. The possibility 
that perception of temporal features of sensory stimuli is biased towards those 
of executed actions is investigated in Chapter 6. Chapters 7 and 8 subsequently 
present preliminary experiments addressing the specific nature of the 
underlying mechanisms supporting these effects. 
1.5. Thesis outline 
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Chapter 2- 4 investigate the claim that predictions during action have a 
functionally-specific influence on perceptual processing. Chapter 2 reports a 
discrimination experiment looking at influences of prediction during action on 
intensity judgements (Experiment 1), while Chapter 3 reports a signal detection 
experiment (Experiments 2) that investigates how prediction during action 
influences detection performance.  Chapter 4 reports an fMRI experiment 
(Experiment 3) investigating how prediction during action influences univariate 
and multivariate measures of visual brain activity.   
Chapter 5 investigates claims about the agent-specificity of predictions during 
action, and reports two psychophysical experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) that 
examine whether effects of action on the perception of predicted outcomes 
generalise across delays of the nature encountered during social interaction. 
Chapter 6 assesses claims about the modality-specificity of predictions during 
action and reports four psychophysical experiments (Experiments 6 – 9) that 
examine whether action influences how temporal features are perceived.  
Chapters 7 and 8 report preliminary investigations into the specific nature and 
origins of the predictive mechanisms identified in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 reports 
a psychophysical experiment investigating the tuning of sensory predictions to 
biological action stimuli (Experiment 10) while Chapter 8 reports a laboratory 
training study that examines how sensory predictions may alter when 
contingencies between action and perception are manipulated (Experiment 11). 
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Chapter 2: Influences of action on intensity judgements 
The Cancellation model suggests that perceptual processing of expected action 
outcomes is suppressed. Support for this hypothesis has come from 
experiments which report that expected action outcomes are perceived as less 
intense. However, the alternative OPPOSE model suggests that predictions 
generated during action bias sensory activity towards (and thereby increase the 
perceived intensity of) expected outcomes, with previous ‘cancellation’ effects 
likely reflecting later prediction-error dependent processes. Evidence for the 
OPPOSE model was recently found in a task where congruent action outcomes 
were judged to be more intense at short delays after action execution, and 
incongruent action outcomes were judged to be more intense at a later delay. 
Experiment 1 was conducted to extend these findings by investigating whether 
these effects reflect a perceptual or decisional bias. Participants produced finger 
actions while observing congruent or incongruent actions performed by an 
avatar hand. After a delay (50 or 200 ms) the observed finger increased in 
brightness, and participants rated its intensity relative to a comparison 
stimulus. Results revealed that congruent action outcomes were rated to be 
more intense at short delays after action execution. While this effect is difficult 
to reconcile with the Cancellation model, it accords with the predictions of the 
OPPOSE model and is consistent with the idea that expectation leads to 
enhanced activity in expected sensory units.   
 
 
42 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 1 two models were introduced describing how predictions 
generated during action should influence perception. The Cancellation model 
hypothesises that predicted action outcomes are ‘subtracted’ from perception 
by suppressing expected sensory activity at the input stage (Bays & Wolpert, 
2007). In contrast, the OPPOSE model hypothesises that predictions generated 
during action act to amplify expected sensory inputs in a similar way to has 
been described for other kinds of expectation (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). 
However, when observers detect unexpected events (i.e. prediction errors), 
these events benefit from an additional process dedicated to surprising 
outcomes e.g. the overt orienting of spatial attention (Itti & Baldi, 2009). 
Both accounts are consistent with evidence that participants tend to rate events 
congruent with executed actions as less intense – such as findings that self-
produced tactile sensations are less ticklish (Blakemore et al., 1999) or self-
produced tones appear quieter (Weiss et al., 2011). Under the Cancellation 
model, relatively less intense perception of congruent action outcomes is taken 
as evidence for a direct suppression of expected sensory activity at the input 
stage (Bays & Wolpert, 2007). In contrast, under the OPPOSE model congruent 
action outcomes appear relatively less intense because incongruent outcomes 
have had their apparent intensity increased by prediction-error dependent 
processes. 
However, the two models make divergent predictions about the timecourse of 
these effects. Under the OPPOSE model, the primary prediction process 
43 
 
necessarily precedes a later process that depends on prediction-errors. As such, 
at short delays after action execution perceptual processing should only reflect 
the influence of the early prediction process, whereas influences of prediction-
error dependent processes should be detectable at later delays. In an intensity 
judgement task, the OPPOSE model would therefore hypothesise that when 
perception is probed at short delays after action, congruent sensory outcomes 
would appear as more intense, given evidence that in non-action contexts 
predictable outcomes appear with greater intensity (Han & VanRullen, 2016).  
Alternatively when perception is probed at longer delays after action, 
incongruent sensory outcomes would appear with greater intensity. These 
predictions about the timecourse of predictive effects are not shared with the 
Cancellation model, which as noted above suggests that expected sensory 
activity is suppressed from the outset (Bays & Wolpert, 2007). 
These predictions were probed in a recent set of psychophysical experiments 
by Yon and Press (2017). Here participants executed finger movements (index 
or middle) while observing synchronised lifts on an avatar hand, which could be 
congruent (same finger) or incongruent (opposite finger) with their own action. 
After action the observed finger increased in apparent brightness and 
participants rated the target’s intensity relative to a comparison. Importantly, 
the target’s brightness increase could occur at early (50 ms) or late (200 ms) 
delays after action, allowing the authors to probe perceptual processing at 
different timepoints while keeping the action-effect delay constant. These 
experiments revealed that when perception was probed at an early delay 
congruent action outcomes were rated as more intense than incongruent 
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outcomes, whereas at the later delay the reverse pattern was observed – with 
incongruent outcomes appearing more intense. Moreover, in a second 
experiment neither effect was observed for non-action stimuli occurring at the 
same spatial locations, suggesting that underlying mechanisms were sensitive 
to the identity of the action outcomes rather than simple spatial features. 
This pattern is consistent with the OPPOSE model’s predictions, and is harder to 
explain under the Cancellation model. However, a limitation in the two 
experiments described is the use of a comparative judgement – participants 
were required to indicate which of two events (target or comparison) was more 
intense. When comparative intensity judgements are used, shifts in the point of 
subjective equivalence (PSE; see Section 2.2.1) across conditions can indicate 
differences in the perceived intensity of a stimulus. However, differences in PSE 
can also be driven by influences on decision processes (Schneider & Komlos, 
2008). For example, participants may perceive all events with equivalent 
intensity, but differences in PSE may arise if participants are biased to select 
one response option. This may be a particular concern given that expectations 
may bias activity in decision circuits before a stimulus is even presented 
(Hanks, Mazurek, Kiani, Hopp, & Shadlen, 2011). 
The limitations associated with comparative judgements can be overcome 
through the use of an equality judgement, where participants do not indicate 
which of two events was the more intense but whether their intensity was the 
same or different (Han & VanRullen, 2016; Schneider & Komlos, 2008). In an 
equality judgement task the value of the PSE is not affected by biases to select 
one response option (same or different).  To investigate whether the effects 
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reported by Yon and Press (2017 – Experiments 1 and 2) reflect perceptual or 
response biases we replicated the paradigm used, but required participants to 
make equality rather than comparative judgements. If effects were driven by 
biases to select one response alternative these should not be found when an 
equality judgement is used. In contrast, if effects occur at a perceptual locus 
they should persist under this procedural change. 
2.2. Experiment 1 
2.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Twenty-six participants (19 female, mean age 24.7 years, SD =4.1) were 
recruited from Birkbeck, University of London and paid a small honorarium for 
their participation. Four of these were replacements for participants who could 
not complete the perceptual discrimination (modelled PSEs were beyond the 
range of presented stimuli and/or acceptable psychometric functions could not 
be modelled to their responses- see below).  
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Figure 2.1: Timecourse of presentation and stimuli in Experiment 1 
Procedure and Stimuli 
The experiment was conducted in MATLAB using the Cogent toolbox. 
Participants began each trial holding down two keys on a keypad with their 
right index and little finger. At the start of the trial, a hand at rest was presented 
on a computer monitor (Fig 2.1; CRT monitor, 32 x 24 cm, 85 Hz, 21 DPI). The 
participant’s hand was visually occluded, and rotated 90° with respect to the 
observed hand, such that both index and middle finger movements were at 
body midline – breaking spatial compatibility between executed and observed 
actions (Catmur & Heyes, 2011). Participants were instructed to lift either their 
index or middle finger, producing large rapid single movements. Executed 
actions were freely selected, and participants were instructed to perform 
roughly equal numbers of each movement in a random sequence. When 
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participants lifted their finger, the neutral hand image was immediately (within 
11.8 ms, given the screen refresh rate) replaced by one depicting the hand 
performing either an index or middle finger lift. This sequence resulted in 
apparent motion of the observed finger approximately synchronized with the 
participant’s action. Participants could observe a congruent action outcome (e.g. 
execute index lift, observe index lift) or an incongruent action outcome (e.g. 
execute index lift, observe middle finger lift), and both outcome types were 
presented with equal probability (see below). At a variable time after the 
observed and executed lift (50 ms or 200 ms), the finger flashed for 100 ms at 
one of seven intensities (increased brightness by 10-70 %, in 10 % steps) 
before returning to its original brightness level for a further 300 ms. Following 
a 1000 ms ISI, a reference square – with equivalent brightness to the target 
midpoint (40% of the target continuum) - was presented for 100 ms (see Fig. 
2.1). 
After 400-500 ms participants judged whether the target or reference events 
were the same or different brightness, responding with a keypress made with 
their left thumb. They subsequently returned their right lifted finger to the start 
key, with their finger lifted throughout the trial until this point. The next trial 
started after 1000 ms. 
Participants completed at least 280 trials; 70 at each of the two delays in the 
congruent and incongruent conditions. The experiment was divided into four 
blocks. The first three blocks each comprised 70 trials, while the fourth ran until 
participants had completed 140 trials of each lift. In breaks between blocks 
participants were given feedback on-screen regarding the distribution of their 
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responses. Responses beyond the 140th trial for each movement were not 
recorded. 
To estimate psychometric functions, responses for each participant were 
modelled by fitting Gaussians (see Figure 2.2). This procedure was performed 
separately for congruent and incongruent response data for each delay level. In 
each condition, bias was inferred from the PSE (the mean of the fitted Gaussian) 
and precision from the difference threshold. The PSE describes the point where 
participants judge the target and reference events to have equal brightness, 
with lower values indicative of brighter target percepts. Judgement precision 
was inferred from the standard deviation of the fitted Gaussian, with lower 
thresholds reflected more consistent categorisations, thereby indicating better 
performance (see Fig. 2.2). 
2.2.2. Results 
PSE and precision values were analysed via separate repeated measures 
ANOVAs, with factors of Action Congruency (congruent, incongruent) and Delay 
(50 ms, 200 ms). No significant effects were found in the precision data (all p> 
.165). However, the PSE analysis revealed a significant main effect of Delay, 
F(1,25) = 18.911, p<.001, ηp2 = .431, alongside a significant interaction between 
Delay and Action Congruency, F(1,24) = 7.125, p = .013, ηp2 = .222. This 
interaction reflected the fact that PSEs at the 50 ms delay were lower for 
congruent outcomes (mean = 34.0 %, SEM = 2.44) than incongruent outcomes 
(mean = 36.3 %, SEM = 2.62; t(25) = 2.326, p=.028, d = .174), while PSEs at the 
200 ms were higher for congruent outcomes (mean = 40.2 %, SEM = 2.37) than 
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incongruent outcomes (mean = 39.2 %, SEM = 2.62) – although this difference 
did not reach statistical significance (t(25) = 1.613, p=.119; see Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2: A. Demonstration of how the PSE was calculated in Experiment 1 with 
psychometric functions for an example participant, for stimuli congruent (saturated) 
and incongruent (faded) with action. B. Mean PSEs across congruency conditions at 
each delay across all conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% within-
participant confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005). 
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2.2.3. Discussion 
This broad pattern of results matches those obtained by Yon and Press (2017; 
Experiments 1 and 2), with effects of action congruency varying as a function of 
timecourse, suggesting that previous demonstrations of these effects were 
unlikely to be driven by response bias. Our experiment replicates the early 
advantage for expected action outcomes, with significantly lower PSEs (i.e. 
brighter percepts) for congruent relative to incongruent outcomes. However, 
we did not observe as convincing evidence for a later cancellation effect. A likely 
reason for this difference with respect to previous experiments is that equality 
judgements are more difficult, leading to noisier PSE estimates. Indeed, 
previous work explicitly comparing judgement types in similar psychophysical 
tasks suggests that equality judgements have reduced sensitivity to effects on 
perceived intensity when compared to comparative judgements (Anton-
Erxleben, Abrams, & Carrasco, 2010).  Nonetheless this experiment finds 
convincing evidence that at short delays after action expected action outcomes 
appear as more intense, and that trends toward more intense perception of 
unexpected action outcomes only emerge at later delays.  
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the predictions of the OPPOSE 
model. Under this model, a primary prediction process is hypothesised to 
facilitate processing of expected action outcomes (increasing the apparent 
intensity of predicted outcomes) while a secondary prediction-error dependent 
process is deployed when unexpected events are detected (increasing the 
apparent intensity of unpredicted outcomes). Importantly, as prediction-errors 
are necessarily computed after predictions, effects of the former kind should be 
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seen at early delays after action whereas effects of the latter kind should be 
seen at later delays – as was reflected in the interaction found in Experiment 1, 
mirroring the results of Yon and Press (2017; Experiments 1 and 2). These 
results are harder to reconcile with the Cancellation model, which assumes that 
sensory activity associated with expected outcomes is directly suppressed at an 
early processing stage (Bays & Wolpert, 2007). 
The OPPOSE model suggests that predictions generated during action influence 
perceptual processing in a comparable way to other kinds of predictive signal – 
such as those based on sensory context (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). 
Indeed, the early effect identified in Experiment 1 closely resembles effects 
which suggest that grey disks appearing in a predictable shape context appear 
with greater contrast than equivalent edges presented amongst random lines 
(i.e. a context that does not support generation of predictions; Han & VanRullen, 
2016). Han and VanRullen (2016) tentatively suggest that their effect of shape 
contexts on apparent contrast reflects excitatory predictive feedback that 
increases neuronal responses in sensory areas. The results of Experiment 1 are 
consistent with the possibility that similar predictive mechanisms operate 
during action. 
Through which mechanisms might ‘excitatory predictive feedback’ increase the 
apparent intensity of congruent action outcomes? Computational models in 
other areas of psychophysics have suggested that perceived intensity 
judgements scale with the activation in sensory units (Cutrone, Heeger, & 
Carrasco, 2014). It has been suggested that effects of expectation in non-action 
contexts can be understood as operating through an additive  mechanism, with 
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predictions biasing activity in expected sensory units (Summerfield & de Lange, 
2014; Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield, 2012) possibly by sharpening the tuning 
curves of sensory units expected to be stimulated (Summerfield & Tsetsos, 
2015). Such predictive enhancements may therefore be expected to produce 
enhancements in perceived contrast – consistent with the early enhancement in 
perceived intensity for congruent action outcomes seen in Experiment 1 and 
Yon and Press (2017). 
2.3. Chapter summary 
The Cancellation and OPPOSE models make contrasting predictions about how 
expectations during action should influence the apparent intensity of sensory 
outcomes. Experiment 1 suggests that at early delays after action execution 
expected action outcomes appear with greater intensity, with the effect 
changing at delay – in line with the predictions of the OPPOSE model. 
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Chapter 3: Influences of action on detection performance 
The Cancellation model hypothesises that perceptual processing of expected 
action outcomes is suppressed – making these events harder to perceive 
relative to unexpected outcomes. Conversely, the OPPOSE model hypothesises 
that expectations during action increase the activation of expected sensory 
units, entailing that observers are more likely to perceive expected outcomes 
relative to unexpected ones. Experiment 2 was conducted to compare the 
contrasting predictions of these accounts in a signal detection task. Participants 
executed finger movements and were required to detect the congruent (i.e. 
expected) or incongruent (i.e. unexpected) movements observed on an avatar 
hand, giving confidence ratings alongside their perceptual decisions.  Signal 
detection measures (Green & Swets, 1966) were calculated from both detection 
judgements and confidence ratings to quantify how participant’s objective and 
subjective sensitivity and bias varied as a function of action-outcome 
congruency. While no significant effects were found in the metacognitive 
measures, Experiment 2 did reveal that participants show greater perceptual 
sensitivity (higher d’) to congruent action outcomes, and were also more liberal 
in reporting their presence (lower c). These results are difficult to reconcile 
with the Cancellation model, but are consistent with the OPPOSE model and the 
idea that expectations bias sensory populations towards expected outcomes. 
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3.1. Introduction 
The Cancellation model suggests that sensory predictions generated during 
movement are used to suppress perception of expected action outcomes. This 
account has traditionally drawn support from studies which suggest that 
expected action outcomes are perceived as phenomenally less intense (e.g. you 
cannot tickle yourself; Blakemore et al, 1999). In Sections 1.2.4 and 2.1, an 
alternative account of sensory prediction during action was outlined – the 
OPPOSE model. Under this model prediction during action should have similar 
facilitatory effects on detection as are seen in passive contexts (e.g. when 
contextual cues improve accuracy, Palmer, 1975). 
Most studies supporting the Cancellation model have used suprathreshold 
stimuli and have asked participants to make judgements about the intensity of 
an action outcome – such as the force of a tactile tap (Bays et al., 2005) or the 
loudness of a tone (Weiss et al., 2011). However, the Cancellation model also 
makes predictions about how expectations should influence the detection of 
stimuli presented at-threshold. An advantage of signal detection tasks is that 
they enable independent characterisation of an observer’s objective sensitivity 
(represented by the statistic d’) to a stimulus and their general tendency to 
report the presence of a stimulus (often represented as the statistic c; Green & 
Swets, 1966; See Section 3.2.1.). Under the Cancellation model, processing of 
expected action outcomes is suppressed. As the mechanistic details of this 
suppression are unclear, it is possible that this could manifest as a reduction in 
sensitivity for outcomes congruent with executed actions. However, the 
Cancellation model could also predict differences in criterion c, e.g., if 
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suppression is achieved by dampening the activity of expected sensory units, 
generating generally more conservative responding (higher c) for congruent 
action outcomes.  
Different predictions are made by the OPPOSE model, which hypothesises 
equivalent effects of expectation on detection performance in action and non-
action contexts. Outside of action, some have reported that valid expectations 
improve perceptual sensitivity. For example, Stein and Peelen (2015; 
Experiment 2d) report that when participants detect phase-scrambled target 
images, d’ is increased by valid cues about object type (e.g. the written word 
‘car’). However, it has been queried whether such findings reflect effects of 
expectation or top-down attention, given that written names could imply the 
cued item is task-relevant as well as engendering probabilistic expectations 
(Summerfield & Egner, 2016). A less controversial finding in the signal 
detection literature is that increasing the conditional probability of a stimulus 
liberalises responding, generating both more hits and false alarms (Swets, 
Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961). One reading of these effects suggests that such 
response liberalisation reflects the fact that observers adopt a decision strategy 
that reflects stimulus probability, without any changes in perceptual processing. 
However, a perceptual locus of such criterion shifts was suggested in an 
experiment by Wyart et al. (2012). Here the authors report a task where 
participants detected oriented Gabors in noise, but where stimuli could be 
conditionally more or less probable (i.e. expected and unexpected). While signal 
detection measures revealed expected stimuli were associated with more 
liberal response criteria while leaving sensitivity (measured as d’) unchanged, a 
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combination of psychophysical reverse correlation analyses (Solomon, 2002) 
and explicit computational modelling suggested that both hits and false-alarms 
reflected sensitivity to signal-like noise, and that effects of expectation were 
best accounted by assuming that expectations induced early sensory biases 
rather than influences on later decision thresholds. This finding is consistent 
with the idea that expectations bias sensory populations toward expected 
outcomes (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). 
 The logic of the traditional signal detection task has also been extended by 
researchers in metacognition to subjective judgements about task performance 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014). In ‘Type II’ signal detection tasks participants make the 
same (Type I) judgements about the presence or absence of a stimulus, 
alongside (Type II) confidence judgements about the accuracy of their 
responses (See Figure 3.2). Type II tasks permit the calculation of analogous 
statistics that capture metacognitive sensitivity (i.e. how much subjective 
confidence tracks objective accuracy) and metacognitive biases (i.e. tendency to 
report high or low confidence). While we are not concerned with metacognition 
specifically in this thesis, it has previously been suggested that metacognitive 
biases in perceptual tasks may be a useful proxy for the vividness of a 
perceptual experience– a tendency to be less confident in one condition of a 
detection task over another may reflect weaker subjective experiences upon 
which to base a decision (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Peirce & Jastrow, 1884). It is 
therefore also possible to derive predictions about how expectations during 
action should influence metacognitive biases in perceptual tasks. Under the 
Cancellation model, expected action outcomes may have their intensity 
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suppressed, inducing conservative metacognitive responding, whereas under 
the OPPOSE model participants may show liberal metacognitive responding, as 
has been seen for expected events outside of action contexts (Sherman, Seth, 
Barrett, & Kanai, 2015). 
The Cancellation and OPPOSE models are contrasted in this chapter by 
investigating how prediction during action influences Type I and Type II 
detection performance. In Experiment 2, Participants executed finger tap 
movements (e.g. index finger movement) while observing congruent (index 
finger) and incongruent (middle finger) actions of an avatar hand. Observed 
action stimuli were presented at perceptual threshold and were backward 
masked, making them difficult to detect. (NB: Movements were altered from 
finger lifts in Experiment 1 to finger taps in Experiment 2, as piloting found 
observed lifting movements difficult to backwards mask – perhaps due to the 
fact that lifting movements lead to slight increases in visual angle - see below). 
Participants performed both Type I (stimulus presence) and Type II (confidence 
in Type I) decisions, and signal detection measures were used to compare 
perceptual performance as a function of action-outcome congruency. For Type I 
measures, the Cancellation model predicts reduced sensitivity and/or more 
conservative responding for congruent action outcomes, whereas the OPPOSE 
model predicts enhanced sensitivity and/or more liberal responding. For Type 
II measures, the Cancellation model may predict more conservative 
metacognitive responding for congruent action outcomes, whereas the OPPOSE 
model may predict more liberal metacognitive responding for these events.  
3.2. Experiment 2 
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3.2.1. Method 
Participants 
An opportunity sample of seventy participants (58 female, mean age = 27.4 
years, SD = 7.2) were recruited from Birkbeck, University of London. 
Participants were second year psychology students who took part as part of a 
research methods practical class. It should be noted that a large number of 
participants were recruited for the present experiment because I was also 
interested in examining how individual differences in any expectation effects 
related to individual differences in schizotypy – analyses not reported in the 
present thesis due to the examination of a theoretically tangential question. 
Procedure and Stimuli 
Participants were seated approximately 55 cm from a computer monitor inside 
a dimly lit cubicle, with their right hand positioned over a keypad placed in 
front of the body midline. Like in Experiment 1, the keypad was positioned 
perpendicular to the computer monitor to disrupt spatial alignment between 
the participant’s own hand and onscreen hand, and participants were required 
to position their index and middle fingers above two keys. A black screen 
occluded view of their right hand. Perceptual and metacognitive judgements 
were made with the left thumb on a separate keypad. The experiment was run 
using the Cogent toolbox for MATLAB. Grayscale avatar hand stimuli were 
created in Poser 10 (Smith Micro Software) and subtended ~15° vertically 
and~10° of visual field. All stimuli were presented against a grey background 
on a CRT computer monitor (32 x 24 cm, 85 Hz, 21 DPI). 
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During the experiment participants completed a task that involved the 
execution of finger taps and judgements about an observed hand presented on 
screen. The sequence of stimulus events is shown in Figure 3.1. At the beginning 
of each trial participants were presented with the avatar hand with both index 
and middle fingers raised. Participants were instructed to perform either a right 
index or middle finger tap movement (freely selected), recorded by a keypress. 
Half of the trials were ‘signal present’, where executed movements triggered an 
immediate replacement of the initial hand image by one with a single lowered 
finger, creating the impression of an apparent movement in approximate 
synchrony with the participant’s own tap. The observed movement could either 
be congruent (i.e. the same finger) or incongruent (i.e. the opposite finger) with 
the participants’ own movements. Congruent and incongruent events were 
presented with equal probability (see Section 1.2.2). The remaining half of trials 
were ‘signal absent’, upon which no movement of the avatar hand occurred. 
After 17 ms, the region of avatar hand containing the index and middle fingers 
was backwards masked by an oval stimulus constructed from a texture of 
overlaid avatar fingers (see Figure 3.1). Such a mask was used given previous 
work which suggests that biological action stimuli are most effectively masked 
when masks are composed of the same elements as the target stimulus (Cutting, 
Moore, & Morrison, 1988). After a further 100 ms, the entire screen was 
replaced by visual white noise. After a random 300 – 600 ms delay, the screen 
was replaced by a question about a specific finger on the avatar hand (e.g. Did 
the INDEX finger move?).  Questions probed the congruent or incongruent 
finger of the avatar with equal probability, though on signal present trials the 
unmoved finger was never probed. Participants indicated their Type I 
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perceptual judgement with a left thumb press, and were then presented with a 
prompt to make a Type II judgement (‘High confidence or low confidence?’) 
with an additional thumb press. Neither response was speeded. 
Before the main task participants completed 16 practice trials – an initial eight 
with executed actions and only perceptual judgements, and a further eight with 
executed actions and both perceptual and metacognitive judgements. To 
present stimuli at threshold, practice was followed by an adaptive staircase 
session in which participants detected masked avatar finger movements as 
described above, without executing their tapping actions. Half of trials were 
signal present (observed index or middle movement equiprobable), while the 
remaining half were signal absent. The magnitude of the observed finger tap on 
signal present trials (degrees of rotation relative to metacarpophalangeal joint) 
was adjusted according to a one-up-one-down staircase, with an initial rotation 
angle of 16° and initial step size of 4°. After each hit the observed rotation 
decreased by the step size (to a minimum of 1°), whereas each miss increased 
the observation rotation (to a maximum of 16°). At each reversal point the 
stepsize halved, to a minimum of 1°. The staircase was terminated after twelve 
reversals, and the threshold was estimated by averaging the rotation angles 
presented at the final six reversal points. Observed movements on signal 
present trials in the main experiment were displayed at each participant’s 
threshold value. 
Participants completed at least 200 trials during the main experiment - 100 
each where they executed index and middle finger taps. Responses were 
recorded for all trials until the experiment this criterion was reached.  Breaks 
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were taken every 40 trials, at which point participants received feedback about 
the distribution of their responses. The experiment was terminated once 
participants had completed 100 of each movement type.  Trial types were 
randomised across the experiment.   
Figure 3.1: Timecourse of presentation and stimuli in Experiment 2. 
 
Measures of Type I and Type II sensitivity and bias 
In Type I signal detection tasks stimuli can be objectively present or absent, and 
participants can respond either ‘present’ or ‘absent’. In Type II signal detection 
tasks, a Type I response can be objectively correct or incorrect and participants 
63 
 
can report ‘high confidence’ or ‘low confidence’. Figure 3.2 illustrates the kinds 
of responses that are possible in such a task. 
 
Figure 3.2: Possible response types in a Type I (left) and Type II (right) signal 
detection task. 
For our analyses we used Type I d’ as a measure of perceptual sensitivity, 
calculated as d’= z(Type I hit rate) – z(Type I false alarm rate), and Type I c as a 
measure of response bias, calculated as c = - 0.5(z(Type I hit rate)  + z(Type I 
false alarm rate)]. High Type I d’ values indicate greater perceptual sensitivity, 
while high c values indicate more conservative responding (i.e. fewer ‘stimulus 
present’ responses). 
It is possible to derive an equivalent measure of Type II d’ as an index of 
metacognitive sensitivity (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001), though it has 
been argued that such a method depends on the untenable assumption that 
correct and incorrect judgements generate normal distributions of evidence 
along an internal decision axis (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007). Maniscalco and Lau 
(2012) introduced an alternative measure of Type II sensitivity – meta-d – 
which is estimated on the basis of Type I and Type II responses and does not 
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depend on these assumptions. This measure was therefore used as an index of 
metacognitive sensitivity, calculated using openly available code 
(http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/) as an index of 
metacognitive sensitivity. Metacognitive bias was inferred from Type II c, where 
c = - 0.5(z(Type II hit rate)  + z(Type II false alarm rate)].  
3.2.2. Results  
Participants were successful in producing roughly equivalent numbers of index 
and middle finger actions (mean = 51.54% Index actions, SD = 4.6%). Paired 
sample t-tests were used to compare Type I sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) values 
across congruency conditions.  d’ was found to be higher on congruent trials 
(mean = 1.70, SEM = .108) than on incongruent trials (mean = 1.57, SEM =.097; 
t(69) =2.832, p=.006, d=.145).  Analyses also revealed that observers were more 
liberal in reporting observed finger movement on congruent trials (mean = 
.019, SEM = .085) than on incongruent trials (mean = .195, SEM = .070; t(69) = 
3.574, p=.001, d=.261).  These patterns are illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
The same analyses were conducted to compare metacognitive sensitivity (meta-
d) and bias (Type II c) across congruency conditions. No significant differences 
were found in meta-d – t(69) = 1.406, p=.164 -   or Type II c  - t(69) = .863, 
p=.391. 
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Figure 3.3: Mean d’, Type I c, meta-d and Type II c (panels a-d) values across 
congruency conditions in Experiment 2. Error bars display 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005). 
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3.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 found no significant effect of congruency on metacognitive 
sensitivity or bias. While it is difficult to make inferences from null results, these 
findings may suggest that predictions during action do not affect perceptual 
metacognition.  Alternatively, influences on these metacognitive measures may 
exist, but not be detectable given differences in Type I performance. Previous 
work reporting metacognitive biases induced by instructions about stimulus 
probabilities ensured Type I performance across conditions was matched 
(Sherman et al., 2015), and to the extent that Type I performance influences 
Type II performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014), differences in basic task 
performance as reported herein could mask potential influences of motor 
prediction on metacognition. 
Experiment 2 found evidence that participants were more sensitive to 
congruent action outcomes, and less conservative in reporting movement of 
congruent fingers. These results are inconsistent with the Cancellation model, 
which hypothesises that predictions act to suppress the activity of expected 
sensory units during action (Bays & Wolpert, 2007).  Such suppression should 
manifest as either a reduced sensitivity to congruent action outcomes, or more 
conservative responding about their presence. However, the results reported in 
this chapter are consistent with the OPPOSE model, which hypothesises the 
expectations during action operate like predictions in other contexts -  where 
they increase hit rates (Stein & Peelen, 2015) and false alarm rates (Wyart et al., 
2012). 
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Interestingly, our finding that d’ was higher for congruent action outcomes 
appears to contrast with findings from the only other experiment that has 
examined signal sensitivity to action-congruent and –incongruent outcomes. 
Cardoso-Leite and colleagues (2010) found that low-contrast Gabor patches 
with orientations congruent with a learned sensorimotor contingency were 
associated with a reduced d’. However, there are differences between the 
paradigms deployed in these two cases which are likely to explain this 
discrepancy and which led to speculation that the Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010) 
findings may not generalise. For instance, the Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010) study 
utilised a pre-cue (oriented lines) that was similar in nature to the action 
effects, which could have engendered a form of repetition suppression on 
congruent trials. Additionally, average d’ was higher in the experiment reported 
by Cardoso-Leite et al. (mean = 2.56) than in the experiments reported here 
(mean = 1.64, SD = .84).  It is therefore possible that in Cardoso-Leite et al., 
(2010) action outcomes were not presented at detection threshold, and that 
incongruent outcomes benefitted from prediction-error-dependent processes 
on some trials (see Experiment 1).  
Our findings suggest that sensory prediction during action has a similar 
influence on perceptual processing as other kinds of expectation, and are 
consistent with the idea that predictions additively bias activity in expected 
sensory units (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). However, the specific pattern of 
these results differs from some previous studies in sensory cognition. For 
example, Wyart et al. (2012) find that expected outcomes are associated with 
less conservative responding (lower c) but do not find any effects on d’. The 
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authors suggest this pattern can be explained if predictions bias sensory 
populations in an additive fashion – equivalently increasing hits on signal 
present trials and false alarms on signal absent trials.  In contrast, our 
experiments find the same effect of congruency on criterion (lower c values) 
alongside higher d’ values for congruent events. 
One possible explanation for this difference is that prediction during action 
increases sensory gain in a multiplicative fashion – increasing the activation in 
sensory units proportionally with signal strength – in a similar way to that 
which has been reported for attention (Reynolds & Heeger, 2009; see Figure 
3.4). Alternatively, it is possible for an additive mechanism to generate 
influences on both c and d’ if an observer’s threshold for reporting detection is 
non-stationary across trials (Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009). A schematic 
example is illustrated in Figure 3.4.b. If on a given trial a threshold for reporting 
detection is high, additive biases will have larger effects on hits – increasing the 
likelihood that present signals cross threshold - but will not increase false 
alarms on signal absent trials. In contrast, if a threshold for reporting detection 
is low, additive biases will increase the likelihood that signal-like noise passes 
decision threshold, while truly present signals will be detected regardless.  
Importantly, under this scheme the effect of additive biases on d’ and c will 
depend on the range of detection thresholds an observer adopts across trials. In 
particular, when observers adopt a generally conservative threshold (as was the 
case across congruency conditions in Experiment 3, mean c = .107), additive 
biases will have a larger effect on hit rates than false alarm rates – increasing 
both d’ and c.  
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Figure 3.4: Schematics illustrating possible effects of predictive biasing on signal 
detection performance. Blue bars indicate the signal-like activity (signal + noise on 
present trials, pure noise on absent trials), while red bars indicate increases in 
activation resulting from prediction during action. Dashed lines indicate a hypothetical 
threshold on a given set of trials which activity has to reach for a participant to respond 
‘signal present’. A: If prediction increases sensory gain in a multiplicative fashion, 
signal and signal-like noise will be more likely to reach detection threshold, but the 
effect will be more pronounced for true signals. B: If prediction biases sensory units  in 
an additive fashion, signal and signal-like noise will be equivalently more likely to 
reach detection threshold – though whether this has a larger effect on signal present or 
signal absent trials depends on where detection threshold is placed (see Section 3.2.3) 
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Traditional signal detection theoretic measures are not suited to evaluating 
these possibilities, as by definition it is not possible to calculate measures of 
sensitivity and bias separately for signal-present and –absent trials. However, it 
would be possible to investigate these questions using the psychophysical 
reverse correlation approach described by Wyart et al. (2012).  Here, the 
authors found that expectations increased the sensitivity of false alarms to 
signal-like noise, and that effects of expectation were best modelled as an 
additive increase in sensory activity. If prediction during action also has an 
additive effect on activity in expected sensory units, comparable effects should 
be obtained in action tasks. Alternatively, if prediction during action influences 
gain in a multiplicative fashion (Reynolds & Heeger, 2009), effects of prediction 
on energy sensitivity should be larger for stronger (i.e. present) signals (Wyart 
et al., 2012).  While external signal-like noise was not systematically varied in 
this experiment – precluding a reverse correlation analysis – this remains an 
important question for future work. 
3.3. Chapter Summary 
The Cancellation and OPPOSE models make contrasting predictions about how 
prediction during action should influence performance on detection tasks. 
Experiments 2 suggests that participants are more sensitive to and more liberal 
in reporting the presence of congruent action outcomes – in line with the 
predictions of the OPPOSE model. 
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Chapter 4 – Influences of action on visual brain activity 
The Cancellation model suggests that sensory processing of expected action 
outcomes is suppressed at the input stage. This contrasts with the OPPOSE 
model, which suggests that expectations generated on the basis of action bias 
sensory units in line with expected outcomes. This chapter investigates these 
two contrasting predictions in an fMRI experiment. In Experiment 3 
participants completed a task that involved the execution of finger movements 
(index and little finger abductions) while observing congruent (i.e. expected) 
and incongruent (i.e. unexpected) actions performed by an on-screen avatar 
hand. Through an additional orthogonal manipulation of top-down attention, 
the observed actions could be relevant or irrelevant to the perceptual task. 
Multivariate pattern classifiers were built to decode the identity of observed 
stimuli on congruent and incongruent trials, and classifier performance was 
used a proxy for the quality of underlying sensory representations. This 
permitted analysis of how visual processing is altered as a function of action-
outcome congruency. Results revealed significant decoding of stimulus identity 
in clusters across the visual cortical hierarchy. Importantly, results revealed 
superior decoding of congruent action outcomes relative to incongruent 
outcomes in occipital and occipitotemporal brain regions. Additional analyses of 
stimulus-specific univariate activity revealed that these decoding enhancements 
were accompanied in reduced activity on congruent trials in voxels tuned away 
from the presented stimulus. These results are difficult to reconcile with the 
Cancellation model, but are consistent with the idea that expectations during 
action bias sensory populations towards predicted outcomes.  
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4.1. Introduction 
The Cancellation model proposes that the expected consequences of action are 
‘subtracted’ from the sensory input (Bays & Wolpert, 2007; Blakemore et al., 
2000). Support for this hypothesis has been drawn from fMRI studies that have 
reported that events predictable on the basis of action are associated with 
reduced BOLD responses in sensory brain areas.  In touch, Blakemore et al. 
(1998) report that activity in the secondary somatosensory cortex (SII) elicited 
by brushing sensations applied to the hand are reduced when participants 
operate the brush (i.e. when stimuli are predictable) compared to when the 
brush is operated by the experimenter. Similarly, a number of studies have 
reported that force taps which are delivered in synchrony with a participant’s 
own tapping movement (i.e. in line with temporal predictions) elicit reduced 
responses in SII compared to force taps delivered at subsecond delays (Shergill 
et al., 2013, 2014).  
Similar results are obtained in visual areas throughout the cortical hierarchy. 
For example, in an experiment reported by Stanley and Miall (2007) 
participants viewed an avatar hand performing sequential hand opening and 
closing movements while producing a congruent action sequence (hand 
opening and closing) or an incongruent action (wrist rotation). The authors 
found that congruent visual outcomes were associated with reduced activity in 
the primary visual cortex (V1). Comparable effects are obtained in superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), a region implicated in the processing of biological 
motion and observed actions (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). Leube et al. 
(2003) report an experiment where participants slowly and continuously 
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opened their hand (0.5 Hz) while observing visual feedback of their own 
movements captured on camera. The authors found that imposing 
progressively greater delays on the video feedback (0 -200 ms) led to linear 
increases in  BOLD responses in STS – consistent with the idea that the more 
predictable (i.e. more simultaneous) action outcomes are cancelled.  Kontaris et 
al. (2009) report a similar experiment where participants executed a sequence 
of hand gestures based on auditory cues while observing video feedback from 
their current actions, or incongruent feedback recorded in a previous block. 
This study found that BOLD responses in STS are reduced when actions and 
outcomes are congruent. In all cases, reduced univariate activity is interpreted 
as consistent with the assumption that predicted sensory signals have been 
suppressed, i.e., as consistent with the Cancellation model (Bays & Wolpert, 
2007; Blakemore et al., 2000).  
Outside the action literature, it is commonly reported that predicted sensory 
events are also associated with reduced BOLD responses (Summerfield & Egner, 
2009). For example, visual dots that are presented along an apparent motion 
trajectory (Alink et al., 2010), and geometric shapes (den Ouden, Friston, Daw, 
McIntosh, & Stephan, 2009) and visual objects (Utzerath, St John-Saaltink, 
Buitelaar, & de Lange, 2017) predictable on the basis of a prior stimulus all elicit 
reduced activity in early visual brain areas compared to unpredicted stimuli. 
However, these reductions in univariate signal for expected events are not 
always thought to imply reduced processing by expected sensory populations. 
Indeed, as described previously in this thesis (See Sections 1.2.4. 2.1, 3.1) an 
influential idea in sensory cognition is that expectations bias sensory 
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representations toward predicted outcomes (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014), 
which could be implemented by sharpening the tuning curves of sensory 
neurons sensitive to expected features (Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015). This 
‘sharpening’ in turn reduces the overall activity in sensory populations, leading 
to reduced BOLD responses relative to unexpected events. 
A powerful way to investigate this ‘sharpening’ hypothesis is to investigate how 
expectations influence multivariate measures of BOLD activity (Haynes & Rees, 
2006) given that sharpened population responses should be easier to decode 
using pattern classification techniques. Kok et al. (2012) investigated this 
possibility in an fMRI study where participants observed visual grating stimuli, 
the orientation of which was predicted by an auditory cue. In line with previous 
studies (e.g. Alink et al., 2010), the authors found that BOLD activity in early 
visual areas (V1-V3) was attenuated when expectations were valid relative to 
when they were invalid. Kok et al. (2012) then built separate multivariate 
classifiers that were trained and tested on their ability to decode the orientation 
of observed gratings from patterns of voxel activity for expected and 
unexpected trials. This analysis revealed superior decoding in V1 of stimulus 
identity from trials when expectations were valid relative to invalid, in line with 
the idea that expectations sharpen the responses of sensory populations.  
To date similar multivariate techniques have not been used in fMRI studies 
investigating sensory prediction during action, and divergent predictions are 
made by the Cancellation and OPPOSE models about the pattern that should be 
obtained – which are examined in Experiment 3. Participants performed a task 
in an MRI scanner where they executed finger abduction movements (index or 
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little finger) and observed congruent and incongruent movements on an avatar 
hand. Observed movements also revealed a small coloured dot (red, blue). (NB: 
The effectors and movements used in Experiment 3 were changed relative to 
Experiments 1 and 2 to maximise the perceptual differences between observed 
action stimuli, as we had no a priori predictions about which stimulus 
dimensions are relevant to prediction mechanisms in action). On each trial, 
participants made a judgement about the stimulus display. On task-relevant 
blocks these judgements concerned observed actions, while on task-irrelevant 
blocks judgements concerned the coloured dot. BOLD activity elicited by 
observed stimuli was modelled and analysed using multivariate pattern 
classification techniques, permitting an analysis of how information about 
observed actions varied as a function of congruency and task-relevance. Under 
the Cancellation account, the suppression of neural activity associated with 
expected action outcomes should reduce the signal available to a pattern 
classifier – leading to reduced decoding accuracy for congruent relative to 
incongruent events. Conversely, the OPPOSE model suggests, in line with 
models of sensory prediction outside of action (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014), 
that predictions bias sensory representations toward expected outcomes – 
leading to sharper population responses for congruent events, which should in 
turn be more readily decoded from BOLD activity.  
 
4.2. Experiment 3 
4.2.1. Method 
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Participants 
20 healthy right-handed individuals (14 female, mean age = 23.1 years, SD = 
2.4) were recruited from University College London and paid a small 
honorarium. An additional three participants were tested, but were excluded 
due to excessive movement and discomfort during scanning (two) or as a result 
of a technical error during image acquisition (one).    
Experimental Task 
Stimuli were displayed against a black background on a rear-projection screen 
using a JVC DLA-SX21 projector (26 x 19.5 cm, 60 Hz). Observed hand stimuli 
were generated in Poser 10, and consisted of a gender-neutral right hand 
viewed from a canonical first-person perspective (height ~13 °, width~9° see 
Figure 4.1). Participants lay in the scanner with their right and left hands on 
separate MR-compatible button boxes.  The right hand box was positioned 
across the midline of the participant’s body, such that the index finger was 
above the little finger on the dorsal-ventral axis. Participants depressed two 
buttons on the right hand box with their index and little finger except when 
executing movements (see below). The left hand button box was positioned 
below the right hand box on their left leg, and participants placed their left 
thumb between two response keys.  
Each trial began with the presentation of a white fixation cross, which remained 
present throughout stimulus presentation. After 750 ms, a neutral hand image 
was presented behind the fixation cross. On Movement trials, this neutral hand 
image was also accompanied by an outline shape (square or circle) indicating 
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which action (index or little abduction) the participant was required to perform. 
On Movement trials, this display remained onscreen until participants executed 
the appropriate action (releasing the correct key), at which point the neutral 
hand image was immediately replaced by an image of the avatar hand abducting 
either its index or little finger. This sequence created apparent motion of the 
observed finger that could be congruent or incongruent with the participant’s 
own movement, and that was apparently synchronous with their movement. 
The apparent movement of the avatar hand also revealed a coloured dot (red or 
blue) in the previous fingertip location (see Figure 4.1). We also included No 
Movement trials, where an imperative shape cue did not appear and the 
apparent motion sequence of the onscreen hand occurred after a fixed delay 
438 ms (matched to the average action execution RT in a pilot experiment; a 
fixed delay was implemented such that the onset of movement was 
approximately comparable in predictability relative to trials on which 
participants moved themselves, where they could predict that the movement 
would be present when they moved their finger). These trials were designed to 
allow us to define regions of interest (ROIs) based on responsivity to the 
observation of these stimulus events. After 500 ms, the hand image was 
removed and the screen was blanked for 1000 ms.     
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Figure 4.1: Timecourse of presentation and stimuli used in Experiment 3. In task-
relevant blocks participants made judgements about observed finger movements, 
while in task-irrelevant blocks judgements concerned the colour of the dot revealed 
after the avatar finger abducted. 
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Participants completed one of two tasks. On task-relevant trials, participants 
were required to make a judgement about the identity of the observed finger 
abduction (e.g. did the index finger move?). On task-irrelevant trials, 
participants were required to make a judgement about the colour of the dot 
revealed by finger movement (e.g. was the dot red?). On each trial the question 
was presented for 1500 ms, within which time participants were required to 
indicate their response via a keypress with their left thumb. The next trial began 
after a jittered ITI of 2-6 seconds. 
The experiment was conducted in eight scanning sessions. Each session 
comprised 48 trials. On two thirds of these trials participants executed index or 
little abductions with equal probability, and subsequently observed either 
Congruent or Incongruent action outcomes with equal probability (16 each). 
The remaining third of trials were No Movement trials (16), where participants 
observed index or little abduction movements with equal probability. The task-
relevance manipulation was blocked within each scanning session, such that 
half of the blocks involved judgements where observed actions were task-
relevant and half involved judgements where observed actions were task-
irrelevant. The task participants performed alternated across blocks, with the 
order counterbalanced across participants. At the beginning of each task block 
participants were reminded of the task they were performing, as well as the 
mapping between imperative shape cues and executed actions. This mapping 
was counterbalanced across participants, and was also reversed halfway 
through the experiment (i.e. the beginning of the fifth scanning session) to 
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unconfound cue-outcome congruency and action-outcome congruency over the 
experiment.  
Image Acquisition 
Images were acquired using a 3T Trio MRI scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) using a 32-channel head coil. Functional images were acquired using 
an EPI sequence (ascending slice acquisition, TR = 3.36 s, TE = 3.29 s, 48 slices, 
voxel size: 3 x 3 x 3 mm). Structural images were acquired using an MP-RAGE 
sequence (voxel size: 1 x 1 x 1 mm). 
fMRI Data preprocessing 
Preprocessing was conducted in SPM12. The first six volumes of each 
participant’s data in each scanning run were discarded to allow for T1 
equilibration. All functional images were spatially realigned to the mean image 
(yielding head movement parameters) and temporally-realigned to the 24th 
(middle) slice.  Functional images were then coregistered to the participant’s 
structural scan and segmented to estimate forward and inverse deformation 
fields to transform data from participants’ native space into Montreal 
Neurological Institute space, and vice versa.  
4.2.2. Analysis and Results 
4.2.2.1. Multivariate Pattern Analysis (MVPA)  
MVPA analyses were conducted for each participant using The Decoding 
Toolbox (Hebart, Görgen, & Haynes, 2014). All analyses used a whole-brain 
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searchlight approach. In each analysis, a linear support vector machine (SVM) 
was trained to discriminate which stimulus was observed on a given trial from 
patterns of BOLD activity across voxels.  The initial step in each analysis was the 
specification of a GLM in SPM12 including a separate regressor for each 
stimulus type (e.g. Observed Index) in each experimental condition (e.g. 
Congruent trials) in each scanning run. All regressors were modelled to the 
onset of the observed stimulus, movement parameters were included as 
nuisance regressors, and all regressors in the model were convolved with the 
canonical haemodynamic response function. This GLM generated eight beta 
images (one for each scanning run) for each stimulus type (Index or Little) in 
each experimental condition that were used for subsequent decoding analyses. 
Separate SVMs were trained and tested on the 16 beta images (eight index and 
little) in each experimental condition. This was conducted using a leave-one-out 
cross validation procedure where for each decoding step 14 images from seven 
scanning runs were used to estimate a linear discriminant function separating 
Observed Index and Observed Little finger movements, which was then applied 
to the remaining two beta images to classify them as either Observed Index or 
Observed Little. Each SVM analysis comprised eight decoding steps, where a 
different pair of beta images from each scanning run were reserved for 
classifier testing, and the SVM’s accuracy was calculated as the proportion of 
correctly classified images across all decoding steps.  
 A whole-brain ‘searchlight’ approach was used (Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & 
Bandettini, 2006), which involved conducting a separate SVM for each voxel in 
the brain using the beta values falling within a searchlight radius of 3 voxels, 
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and assigning the SVM’s accuracy to the voxel on which the searchlight was 
centred.  This procedure was used to create decoding maps in participant’s 
native space indicating each voxel’s decoding accuracy relative to chance level 
(50%, i.e., decoding accuracy of 60% is treated as 10%). To allow comparison 
across participants, these decoding maps were normalised into MNI space using 
the forward deformation fields estimated in preprocessing and smoothed using 
a 4mm FWHM Gaussian kernel in SPM12. 
4.2.2.2. MVPA Analyses collapsed across task-relevance 
To maximise sensitivity, MVPA analyses were initially conducted collapsing 
across the task-relevance factor. As such whole-brain searchlight analyses were 
conducted separately for Congruent, Incongruent and No Movement trials, 
yielding three decoding maps per participant that were normalised and 
smoothed (described above). Decoding maps from the No Movement condition 
were used to define regions of interest (ROIs) to compare effects of congruency. 
This was achieved by subjecting the No Movement decoding maps from each 
participant to a one-sample t-test in SPM12, and using cluster-wise inference to 
identify contiguous voxels (no minimum cluster size) where decoding accuracy 
was significantly above chance at the group level (Loose, Wisniewski, Rusconi, 
Goschke, & Haynes, 2017).  This contrast was restricted to occipital and 
temporal brain regions using the SPM12 atlas and used a primary cluster-
defining threshold of p<.001 uncorrected with cluster-wise family-wise error 
(FWE) of p<.05 – a combination which recent authors have suggested 
appropriately controls false positive rates (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016).  
This analysis revealed three clusters in bilateral occipital cortex (BO, 1503 
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voxels), left occipital cortex (LO, 545 voxels) and right occipitotemporal cortex 
(ROT, 339 voxels) which were carried forward as ROIs (see Figure 4.2). 
To investigate the effect of sensory prediction on decoding accuracy, we 
extracted and averaged the decoding accuracies within each ROI separately for 
Congruent and Incongruent trials. These mean accuracies were then subjected 
to a 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, with factors of ROI (BO, LO, ROT) and 
Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent). This revealed a significant main effect of 
Congruency – F(1,19) = 4.781, p=.041,  ηp2 = .201 and no interaction between 
congruency and region of interest (p=.760); see Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2: Right: Occipital and occipitotemporal clusters containing above-chance 
information about observed stimulus identity (index vs little) on No Movement trials 
(p<.001 uncorrected, cluster-wise FWE p<.05). Left: Mean stimulus decoding 
accuracies within each ROI on Congruent (saturated) and Incongruent (faded) trials. 
Error bars represents 95% within-participant confidence intervals. 
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4.2.2.3. MVPA analyses examining interactions with task-relevance 
To investigate whether the effects of Congruency identified above interacted 
with the task-relevance manipulation, additional whole-brain searchlights were 
conducted separately for each combination of Congruency and Task-Relevance. 
This procedure was identical to that described above, though segregating 
stimulus events by relevance halved the number of stimulus events used to 
model beta images for decoding.  Mean decoding accuracies for each participant 
were conducted for each condition in each cluster and these values were 
analysed using a 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of ROI (BO, 
LO, ROT), Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) and Task-Relevance (Relevant, 
Irrelevant). This analysis revealed a three-way interaction between ROI, 
Congruency and Task-Relevance (F(2,38) = 4.725, p=.015, ηp2=.199). As shown 
in Figure 4.3, this three-way interaction reflected the fact that while comparable 
congruency effects were obtained in the BO and LO ROIs regardless of task-
relevance, a significant interaction between Congruency and Task-Relevance 
was obtained in the ROT cluster (F(1,19)= 9.678, p=.006, ηp2=.337). This two-
way interaction reflected a trend toward higher decoding accuracies in the 
Congruent than Incongruent condition when stimuli were task-irrelevant (t(19) 
= 1.930, p=.069) and the opposite pattern when stimuli were task-relevant 
(t(19) = 1.401, p=.177). 
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Figure 4.3: Mean stimulus decoding accuracies within (and collapsed across) each ROI 
on Congruent (saturated) and Incongruent (faded) trials, separately for task-relevant 
(top panel) and task-irrelevant trials (bottom panel). Error bars represents 95% 
within-participant confidence intervals. 
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4.2.2.4. Univariate BOLD amplitude analysis 
While Experiment 3 was primarily concerned with the divergent predictions 
made by the Cancellation and OPPOSE models with respect to how expectations 
during action should alter multivariate measures of sensory brain activity, 
additional analyses were conducted to investigate how action-outcome 
congruency influenced univariate activity. Previous reports of expectation 
sharpening have suggested that the signal-to-noise ratio of sensory populations 
is improved by suppressing the activity in sensory units tuned away from 
expected action outcomes (Kok et al., 2012).  
We investigated whether a similar effect was obtained in Experiment 3 by 
assessing how congruency affected stimulus-specific patterns of univariate 
activity within each of the ROIs used for MVPA analyses.  Using the same 
unnormalised, unsmoothed images used for multivariate decoding, we 
conducted a t-contrast in SPM12 for each participant comparing activity for 
observed index finger stimuli and observed little finger stimuli across all 
conditions. This contrast yielded a t-map for each participant where positive 
and negative values reflected a voxel’s preference for either index or little 
fingers, respectively.  
After assigning a preferred stimulus to each voxel, we extracted univariate 
BOLD signal (beta values) from each voxel separately for congruent and 
incongruent trials as a function of whether the stimulus was the preferred or 
non-preferred stimulus for a given voxel. For example, if a voxel was classified 
as ‘index preferring’, the univariate signal on congruent trials where an index 
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finger was presented was congruent-tuned to, whereas signal on the same trials 
was congruent-tuned away for voxels classified as ‘little preferring’.  Univariate 
BOLD signal was extracted from each voxel in each of the clusters used for 
decoding and analysed with a 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors 
of ROI (BO, LO, ROT), Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) and Stimulus-
Preference (tuned to stimulus, tuned away from stimulus). This analysis 
revealed a significant interaction between congruency and stimulus preference 
(F(1,19)= 9.306, p=.007, ηp2=.329) which did not vary across cluster (p=.168).    
This interaction reflected weaker activity on congruent relative to incongruent 
trials in voxels tuned away from the current stimulus (t(19) = 2.214, p=.039), 
with no congruency effect in voxels tuned towards it (p =.286: see Fig 4.4).   
Therefore, like previous reports of expectation sharpening, this pattern 
suggests that prediction during action suppresses activity in voxels that are 
tuned away from currently expected outcomes.   
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Figure 4.4: BOLD activity across regions of interest in the visual brain. Activity is lower 
for congruent relative to incongruent trials only in voxels that are tuned away from the 
observed stimulus (e.g., those voxels tuned towards index fingers on trials where little 
finger movements are presented). Error bars represent 95% within-participant 
confidence intervals. 
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4.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 3 revealed that congruent action outcomes were more readily 
decoded from BOLD activity than incongruent action outcomes across several 
visual brain regions in the occipital and occipitotemporal cortices. These results 
suggest that expectations during action can facilitate visual processing, as 
improvements in stimulus decoding accuracy are typically taken to reflect 
improvements in the quality of underlying sensory representation (Jehee, 
Brady, & Tong, 2011; Kok et al., 2012; Ritchie, Kaplan, & Klein, 2017). 
Consistent with these enhancements, analyses of stimulus-specific univariate 
activity revealed lower BOLD signal on congruent trials only in those units 
tuned away from currently expected action outcomes, in line with previous 
studies showing expectation sharpening (Kok et al., 2012). 
This pattern is difficult to reconcile with the Cancellation model, which 
hypothesises that activity in expected sensory units is suppressed at an early 
processing stage (Bays & Wolpert, 2007). However, it is consistent with the 
OPPOSE model which hypothesises that predictions generated during action 
operate comparably to prediction mechanisms described in non-action 
contexts, and where they are thought to bias activity in expected sensory units 
(Kok et al., 2012; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). 
Relative improvements in decoding accuracy for congruent action outcomes 
were found in clusters that contained above-chance information about stimulus 
identity on No Movement trials. However, it is important to recognise that the 
ability to decode a stimulus provides little information about the precise 
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stimulus feature supporting pattern classification (Ritchie, Kaplan & Klein, 
2017), and indeed the clusters used in Experiment 3 likely span multiple 
anatomically-distinct regions that may contribute to different elements of visual 
processing.   While previous studies looking at top-down influences on 
multivariate measures of visual activity have used more artificial stimuli that 
differ in a simple feature (e.g. grating stimuli with different orientations – Jehee 
et al., 2011; Kok et al., 2012), the observed stimuli used in Experiment 3 differ 
in both lower-level (e.g. retinotopic location of event) and higher-level features 
(e.g. direction of apparent motion, configural action identity). An interesting 
consideration therefore concerns the level in the cortical hierarchy at which 
sensory predictions operate.  
It has previously been suggested that expectations predominantly affect 
processing in V1. In an fMRI study Smith and Muckli (2010) found that when 
participants viewed visual scenes containing empty regions, it was possible to 
decode the identity of the visual scene from V1 voxels whose receptive fields 
centred on the empty region – interpreted as evidence for top-down contextual 
predictions. Given that such decoding was not possible for comparable voxels in 
V2, the authors suggested that V1 may be a privileged site for effects of 
expectation on sensory processing. However, while Kok et al. (2012) similarly 
find enhanced decoding for expected gratings only in V1 (and not V2-3), they 
instead suggest this may reflect the fact that influences of expectation are 
strongest in regions sensitive to the predicted feature. The results of 
Experiment 3 revealed enhanced decoding for congruent action outcomes 
across clusters that likely include a number of visual regions, and while it is 
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difficult to delineate these anatomical regions in the absence of (e.g.) retinotopic 
mapping, this may suggest that predictions influence processing at different 
hierarchical levels – in line with extant predictive coding models (Friston, 2005; 
Rao & Ballard, 1999). 
An interesting feature of these data are the patterns obtained in the right 
occipitotemporal ROI. This region closely corresponds to previous reports of 
the extrastriate body area (EBA), a region which has been implicated by 
numerous neuroimaging studies in the visual analysis of bodies and actions 
(Lingnau & Downing, 2015). A handful of studies have reported that executing 
(Astafiev, Stanley, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2004) or preparing (Kühn, Keizer, 
Rombouts, & Hommel, 2011) hand actions  in the absence of visual stimulation 
elicits activation in EBA, which has been interpreted as reflecting motor 
influences on visual processing. However, it has been controversial whether 
these ‘action-related’ regions are in fact overlapping with those involved in the 
perception of body parts (Peelen & Downing, 2005). In fact separate 
experiments have found that activity related to observed actions in EBA is not 
modulated by action-outcome congruency (Kontaris et al., 2009), suggesting 
that these may not be visual representations that are activated during action. 
However, no previous work has investigated the effect of sensorimotor 
predictions on multivariate brain activity and the results of Experiment 3 
suggest that expectations do act to sharpen stimulus representations in this 
area, thereby indicating that the representations activated during action at least 
overlap with those representing the visual properties.  
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Experiment 3 also found that this right occipitotemporal ROI region exhibited 
an interaction between action-outcome congruency and task-relevance, with a 
pattern reflecting trends towards superior decoding of congruent outcomes 
when these were task-irrelevant and better decoding of incongruent outcomes 
when these were task-relevant. This result contrasts with previous reports 
where effects of expectation and task-relevance on stimulus decoding did not 
interact (Kok et al., 2012), and may be indicative of a mechanistic interaction 
between top-down prediction and attention (Summerfield & Egner, 2009). This 
result is predicted by neither the Cancellation model or the OPPOSE model, 
although it is perhaps worth interpreting cautiously given that neither simple 
effect contributing to it was significant. 
4.3. Chapter summary 
Experiment 3 presented evidence for enhanced multivariate decoding of 
expected, relative to unexpected visual action outcomes in clusters spanning a 
number of visual brain regions. These results are hard to reconcile with the 
Cancellation model, but are consistent with the idea that sensory predictions 
generated during action operate similarly to those in non-action contexts as 
hypothesised by the OPPOSE model.  
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Chapter 5:  Influences of action on perception of imitative 
reactions 
It is widely assumed that the sensorimotor models we use to predict the direct 
consequences of our own movements can be used to support perception of 
imitative reactions in others – leading to smooth, fluent social interactions. 
However, while the direct outcomes of our movements typically occur at short, 
predictable delays after action execution, the reactions of others occur at longer, 
variable delays in the order of seconds.  This temporal variability could 
preclude the prediction of reactions, given that sensorimotor predictions have 
previously been argued to operate with a subsecond precision.  Experiments 4 
and 5 were conducted to investigate the temporal profile of visuomotor 
prediction, assessing whether predictive effects generalise across the 
suprasecond delays that likely characterise social interaction. Participants 
completed a task based on the paradigm used in Experiment 1, where 
congruent or incongruent action outcomes could occur synchronously with 
action (0 ms) or at a longer delay (1800 ms or 3600 ms) after action execution. 
Consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 4 revealed that congruent action 
outcomes were rated as more intense than incongruent outcomes. Importantly, 
this facilitatory effect was found irrespective of whether outcomes occurred 
immediately or at delay. Experiment 5 replicated this finding and demonstrated 
that it was not the result of response bias. These findings therefore suggest that 
sensorimotor predictions operate with sufficient temporal-generality to 
support perception of imitative reactions in others. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Behavioural success for humans and other animals often depends on effectively 
navigating the social world – on accurately anticipating and interpreting the 
actions of conspecifics (Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2017). Section 1.3 introduced the 
influential hypothesis that agents may use sensorimotor predictions derived 
from models of their own actions to anticipating similar reactions in their 
interaction partners, given that sensory consequences produced by self and 
other are perceptually similar (e.g. when we wave to a friend and they return 
the gesture). This generalised predictive process is argued to increase our 
sensitivity to matching responses in others; promoting fluent social interactions 
by facilitating rapid and appropriate responding to our partner’s behaviour (see 
Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007 for a discussion). However, as noted in Section 
1.3.2, existing work looking at the temporal profile of sensorimotor prediction 
have suggested that the underlying mechanisms operate with a subsecond 
tuning (Bays et al., 2005). Given that the imitative reactions of other occur in the 
range of seconds – not milliseconds – such tight temporal tuning may preclude 
imitative reactions from benefitting from predictive processes. 
However, to date no work has considered the temporal precision of visual 
prediction during action and since we predominantly experience the reactions 
of others visually it is important to establish whether these mechanisms 
operate with a temporal profile that could support the perception of imitation. 
Experiment 4 was conducted to investigate the temporal profile of visual 
prediction during action, utilising the effect of prediction identified in 
Experiment 1, where congruent action outcomes were rated to be more intense 
95 
 
that incongruent action outcomes when perception was probed at short delays 
(50 ms) after action execution. The task was adapted such that participants 
executed finger movements and were presented with congruent or incongruent 
action outcomes (same or opposite finger) at different delays after execution (0, 
1800 or 3600 ms). The suprasecond delays employed mirror the natural delay 
with which actions are likely imitated, given experimental reports that 
prosocial effects of being imitated arise with action-outcome delays of 2-4 s 
(Bailenson & Yee, 2005; see Catmur & Heyes, 2013). If sensorimotor predictions 
operate across variable action-outcomes in a manner which could support 
social interaction, signatures of prediction should be found across delays, with 
participants rating congruent action outcomes as more intense (brighter) than 
incongruent outcomes. Alternatively, if sensorimotor predictions show tight 
temporal tuning, congruency should interact with action-outcome delay. 
5.2. Experiment 4 
5.2.1. Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants (16 female, mean age = 25.1 years, SD= 6.9) were 
recruited from Birkbeck, University of London and given a small honorarium for 
their participation. Two of these were replacements for participants who did 
not follow task instructions or where PSEs modelled to their responses were 
beyond the range of presented stimuli. 
Procedure and Stimuli 
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Procedure and stimuli were identical to Experiment 1 with the following 
changes (see Figure 5.1). The onscreen avatar hand produced observed actions 
either in synchrony with the participants’ own executed finger lift (0 ms delay) 
or at one of two suprasecond delays (1800 or 3600 ms) with equal probability. 
Unlike Experiment 1, the increase in brightness on the observed finger always 
occurred 50 ms after onset of the observed movement (i.e. the 200 ms delay 
was eliminated). After the presentation of the comparison stimulus participants 
made a comparative judgement (i.e. which stimulus was brighter?) rather than 
an equality judgement. While comparative judgements are potentially more 
prone to response biases (i.e. biases to select one response alternative influence 
PSE values), previous work has found comparative judgements to be more 
sensitive than equality judgements given that the latter are typically harder and 
lead to noisier PSE estimates (Anton-Erxleben et al., 2010). Given previous 
reports that prediction mechanisms may show subsecond tuning (e.g. Bays et 
al., 2005) this more sensitive procedure was used in Experiment 4 to minimise 
the likelihood of a Type II error. 
There were at least 420 trials; 70 at each of the three delays where test stimuli 
were congruent with the lifted finger (i.e. execute index lift, observe index lift) 
and 70 where test stimuli were incongruent with the lifted finger (i.e. execute 
index lift, observe middle lift). The experiment was divided into five blocks. The 
first four blocks comprised 84 trials each, while the fifth ran until participants 
had completed 210 of each finger lift (i.e. index or middle). In breaks between 
blocks participants were given on screen feedback regarding the percentage of 
index and middle finger lifts executed across the experiment. Responses beyond 
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the 210th trial for each movement were not recorded. Trial type was 
randomized and participants completed eight practice trials. Psychometric 
functions were modelled separately to congruent and incongruent response 
data as in Experiment 1, separated by each action-outcome delay condition, 
though these took the form of cumulative Gaussians rather than standard 
Gaussians, and associated pDev statistics were calculated to establish the 
goodness-of- fit for each function (Palamedes toolbox; Kingdom & Prins, 2009; 
see Figure 5.2.) 
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Figure 5.1:  The timecourse of stimulus presentation on a single trial in both 
Experiments 4 and 5. Sensory outcomes were presented at a 0ms (A), 1800 ms (B) or 
3600 ms delay (C) relative to the participant’s own executed action (D). In the above 
figure the observed outcome (index lift) is congruent with the executed action. Note 
that in Experiment 4 participants were required to report which event (target or 
reference) was brighter, while in Experiment 5 participants were required to report 
whether the target and reference events were the same brightness or not. Hand stimuli 
were generated using Poser 7.0 (Smith Micro Software). 
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5.2.2. Results and Discussion 
PSE and precision values were analysed with a 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA, 
with factors of Action Congruency (congruent, incongruent) and Delay (0, 1800, 
3600 ms).  Where appropriate, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied. 
The precision analysis found no effect of Action Congruency (p=.264) or Delay 
(p=.086) and no interaction between these factors (p=.423). However, 
importantly, the PSE analysis revealed a significant main effect of Action 
Congruency (F(1,23) = 7.96, p=.010, ηp2 =.257) reflecting the fact that 
participants had lower PSEs (i.e., brighter target percepts) for congruent (mean 
= 36.7%, SEM =1.6) compared to incongruent stimuli (mean = 39.4%, SEM =1.9; 
see Figure 5.2.). No main effect of Delay (p=.067) or importantly, any interaction 
between Congruency and Delay (p=.807) was observed.  
To examine whether the non-significant interaction between Congruency and 
Delay reflects the absence of an effect or a lack of statistical power, we 
calculated a Bayes Factor (BF10) which represents the ratio of evidence for the 
alternative model over evidence for the null model. It is assumed that BF10<.33 
provide good evidence to support the null (Jeffreys, 1939; Lee & Wagenmakers, 
2014). We conducted a repeated measures Bayesian ANOVA in JASP (Love et al., 
2015) with the same factorial structure. This analysis revealed evidence for the 
null hypothesis over an interaction effect (𝐵𝐹10 = 0.145).  
The effect of Action Congruency, and the absence of its interaction with Delay, 
provides evidence that sensorimotor predictions exhibit the requisite generality 
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to predict imitative responses across action-outcome delays comparable to 
those found in natural social settings.  
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Figure 5.2: Top panel: Demonstration of how the point of subjective equivalence (PSE) 
was calculated in Experiment 4 (left) and Experiment 5 (right) with psychometric 
functions from example participants for stimuli congruent (solid) and incongruent 
(faded) with executed actions. The PSE describes the point where participants judge 
the target and comparison events to have equal brightness. When target stimuli are 
perceived as brighter PSEs tend towards lower values. Bottom panel: Mean PSEs for 
stimuli congruent and incongruent with action, across all action-outcome delays across 
both experiments. Error bars represent 95% within-participant confidence intervals 
(Cousineau, 2005). 
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5.3. Experiment 5 
The results from Experiment 4 provide evidence that congruent action 
outcomes are judged to be more intense than incongruent action outcomes 
regardless of whether these outcomes occur immediately after action execution 
(0 ms condition: replicating Yon & Press, 2017) or if delays in the order of 
seconds are imposed between actions and outcomes (1800 and 3600 ms 
conditions). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that sensorimotor 
predictions may influence perceptual processing of imitative reactions, 
increasing their apparent intensity via additive biases in sensory activity that 
result from prediction (Han & VanRullen, 2016; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014; 
Yon & Press, 2017).  
However, the PSE measure chosen to index perceptual biases induced by 
sensorimotor predictions could be influenced by response biases (as discussed 
in Chapter 2). For example, if all action outcomes are perceived with equivalent 
brightness but participants are biased to select the interval where congruent 
outcomes occur, PSEs would be lower for congruent than incongruent events. 
Such biases could occur given previous reports that activity in decision making 
circuits can be biased towards responding for expected events before a stimulus 
has been presented (Hanks et al., 2011; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). A 
particular concern is that sensorimotor predictions may generate perceptual 
biases when action outcomes are simultaneous (given that Experiment 1 in the 
present thesis already rules out response biases for the simultaneous effects), 
but generate response biases at later delays – giving the impression of a 
temporally-general perceptual prediction. 
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As discussed, Experiment 4 used a comparative judgement to minimise the 
likelihood of a Type II error. However, given that effects were observed in this 
experiment, Experiment 5 was subsequently conducted to address the concerns 
associated with the use of a comparative judgement; by utilizing an equality 
judgement (i.e. were the two events the same or different brightness?). The 
advantage of the equality judgement is that it no longer requires participants to 
select a stimulus as more intense on a given trial, and ensures biases to opt for a 
given response alternative (e.g. same or different) no longer influence the PSE 
value (Han & VanRullen, 2016; Schneider & Komlos, 2008). If the effects 
identified in Experiment 4 operate at a perceptual locus they should also be 
found in Experiment 5, while effects driven by response biases should not 
remain. 
5.3.1. Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-four new participants (21 female, mean age = 21.4 years, SD= 2.5) were 
recruited from Birkbeck, University of London and given a small honorarium for 
their participation. Fourteen of these were replacements for participants who 
did not follow task instructions or where points of subjective equivalence 
modelled to their responses were beyond the range of presented stimuli. This 
relatively high exclusion rate in comparison to Experiment 4 most likely reflects 
the fact that equality judgements are much more difficult and generate noisier 
estimates of underlying psychometric functions than do comparative 
judgements with equivalent stimuli (Anton-Erxleben et al., 2010). 
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Procedure and Stimuli 
The procedure and stimuli used in Experiment 5 were identical to Experiment 
4. However, participants were not asked to judge whether the target or 
reference stimulus was brighter, but whether the two events were the same or 
different brightness. Psychometric functions were therefore modelled as 
standard (not cumulative) Gaussians (as in Experiment 1). 
5.3.2. Results and Discussion 
PSE and precision values were analysed with a 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA, 
with factors of Action Congruency (congruent, incongruent) and Delay (0, 1800, 
3600 ms). Where appropriate, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied. 
The precision analysis revealed a main effect of Delay - F(2,46) = 4.843, p=.023, 
ηp2 =.174 – which followed a significant quadratic trend, F(1,23) = 6.139, p=.021, 
ηp2 =.211. This effect reflected the fact that judgement precision was 
significantly lower for events presented at the 1800 ms action-outcome delay 
(mean = 29.9 %,  SEM =2.08) than events presented at either the 0 ms delay 
(mean =25.9 %, SEM = 1.88; t(23) = 2.373, p=.026) or the 3600 ms delay (mean 
= 26.8 %, SEM = 1.50; t(23) = 2.366, p=.027; precision at the 0 ms and 3600 ms 
delays did not differ, p=.330). No other significant effects were obtained in the 
precision data (all p>.530).   
The PSE analysis also revealed a significant effect of Delay - F(2,46) = 4.152, 
p=.022, ηp2 =.153. This main effect of Delay followed a linear trend – F(1,23) = 
7.22, p=.013, ηp2 =.239 – and reflected lower PSEs (i.e. brighter percepts) for 
events presented at the 0 ms delay (mean = 42.1 %, SEM = 2.31) relative to the 
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3600 ms delay (mean = 45.7 %, SEM = 1.78; t(23) = 2.69, p=.013), with the PSEs 
lying intermediate at the 1800 ms delay (mean = 43.8%, SEM = 2.19) although 
not differing significantly from 0 ms (p = .211) or 3600 ms (p =.079) conditions.  
Crucially, the PSE analysis again demonstrated a significant effect of Action 
Congruency - F(1,23) = 7.313, p=.013, ηp2 =.241 – which did not interact with 
Delay (p=.928).  This main effect reflected lower PSEs for congruent action 
events (mean = 42.9 %, SEM = 2.06) than incongruent events (mean = 44.8 %, 
SEM = 1.96) – suggesting that predicted action outcomes were perceived as 
brighter than unpredicted ones, and that this pattern does not reflect a 
response bias caused by expectation (Hanks et al, 2011). The non-significant 
Action Congruency x Delay result was again shown through a Bayesian ANOVA 
in JASP to reflect the absence of an effect (𝐵𝐹10 = .126).  
The effect of Delay on judgement precision was unpredicted. A speculative 
explanation for this effect is that the timing of the event is perhaps least 
expected at 1800 ms (see Rohenkohl, Cravo, Wyart & Nobre, 2012), relative to 
the timepoint at which action outcomes typically occur (0 ms) and the 
timepoint which is the latest employed in this paradigm (3600 ms; i.e., if an 
event has not been presented by this point in the epoch then its arrival is 
certain). One could further speculate that such an effect is more pronounced in 
more difficult tasks (see Ratcliff, 2014), explaining why it was obtained with the 
harder equality judgement in Experiment 5 but not the easier comparative 
judgement in Experiment 4 (Anton-Erxleben et al., 2010). The main effect of 
Delay on PSEs may similarly reflect greater processing of events occurring at 
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the earliest timepoint, given the typically strong likelihood that outcomes are 
simultaneous with action. 
Most importantly, the main effect of Action Congruency and the convincing 
absence of an Action Congruency x Delay interaction suggest that the results of 
Experiment 4 were not due to participants being more likely to select the 
congruent event through response bias. Instead, they provide further support 
for the hypothesis that sensorimotor predictions exhibit generality across 
action-outcome delays.  
 
5.4. General Discussion 
It is widely assumed that the sensorimotor predictive processes we use for 
controlling our own actions are useful for supporting perception of the imitative 
reactions of others (e.g., Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). However, it has been 
unclear whether sensory predictions generated during action have the requisite 
generality across time to be useful for perceiving imitation in others. Both 
Experiments 4 and 5 found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that such 
generality is indeed present - signatures of predictive processing, i.e., more 
intense percepts for action-congruent relative to -incongruent sensory events, 
were found regardless of whether outcomes were observed immediately or at 
suprasecond delays.  
The findings of Experiments 4 and 5 are consistent with the idea that 
expectations bias activity in expected sensory units, leading to an enhancement 
in effective signal strength (Wyart, Nobre & Summerfield, 2012; see also 
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Tsetsos & Summerfield, 2015; Carrasco, Ling & Read, 2004). As outlined in 
Section 1.2.2, such a mechanism is thought to facilitate perception of expected 
events in a number of ways e.g., speeding reaction times (Bar, 2004) or 
accelerating the entry of stimuli into conscious awareness (Pinto et al., 2015).  
The present findings crucially demonstrate that visual predictions during action 
operate with a temporal profile that would allow them to influence imitative 
reactions. The resulting increased sensitivity to these reactions is proposed to 
promote fluent social interactions by facilitating rapid and appropriate 
responses to our partner’s behaviour (e.g., Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). It 
has also been suggested that it may facilitate pro-social effects that result from 
perceiving imitation in others, e.g., increased social motivation and rapport (e.g., 
Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Neufeld & Chakrabarti, 2016; van Baaren, Holland, 
Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003) given that the signal on which these 
effects depend is enhanced. Furthermore, one could speculate that – by 
comparison between predictions and sampled inputs - these predictive 
processes could also assist the detection of unexpected absences of imitation 
(e.g., when a friend does not return a wave). Sensitivity to such prediction 
errors could be useful in highlighting the need for further learning (e.g. to infer 
whether they are upset with are us) or the need for a novel response (e.g. to call 
their name). 
Interestingly, the temporal generalisation found here appears inconsistent with 
a handful of studies in the tactile domain which suggest that sensorimotor 
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predictions show precise temporal tuning1. For example, signatures of 
sensorimotor prediction on tactile perception are seen when action execution 
and sensory outcomes are synchronous, but these influences are not seen when 
delays of ~300 ms are imposed between action and outcome (Bays et al., 2005; 
Blakemore et al., 1999). These findings have been argued to reflect adaptive 
processes for action control, given that subsecond tuning will allow the 
predictive processes to contribute to rapid error correction (Wolpert et al., 
1995) and the agentive labelling of self-produced events (Frith, Blakemore, & 
Wolpert, 2000). However, the present experiments present the first 
investigation of the temporal properties of visual prediction during action and 
these discrepant findings can therefore be integrated if it is assumed that visual 
predictions exhibit broader temporal tuning than tactile predictions. Given that 
imitative reactions are typically perceived visually, such a separation between 
modalities may be most adaptive in balancing temporal sensitivity to optimise 
action control with the temporal generality required to optimise perception of 
others.  
The hypothesis tested in Experiments 4 and 5 proposes that predictions we 
generate about the consequences of our own actions also influence perceptual 
processing of imitative reactions of others (Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007; 
Wolpert et al., 2003). This hypothesis would appear to assume that the learning 
                                                        
1
 The experiments supporting this assumption have been designed to examine action control 
theories. To this end they have compared predictive effects for simultaneous outcomes and 
those following subsecond delays and consistently find the largest effects in simultaneous 
conditions. Given that our primary aim was to test theories from social cognition, it was more 
appropriate to compare simultaneous conditions against those employing suprasecond delays 
given that imitative reactions occur in the order of seconds, not milliseconds (see Catmur & 
Heyes, 2013).  
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we acquire through sensorimotor experience with our own direct action effects 
at subsecond delays (e.g., observing our own index finger tapping; (de Wit & 
Dickinson, 2009; Birgit Elsner & Hommel, 2004; Daniel M. Wolpert, Diedrichsen, 
& Flanagan, 2011) generalises over suprasecond action-outcome delays 
(Pearce, 1987). Under this assumption, these processes may only operate for 
the prediction of imitative reactions in others. However, an alternative 
possibility is that predictions at delay may be derived from specific experience 
of others imitating our actions at delay. This account is consistent with the idea 
that the socio-cultural environment is responsible for furnishing the 
mechanisms needed for social interaction (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes, 2012). 
This latter possibility is easier to reconcile with reports of temporal precision in 
touch (Bays et al., 2005), as we have little opportunity to learn that tactile 
outcomes follow our actions at delay. Importantly, this hypothesis assumes that 
the predictive process is not dependent on the fact that imitative reactions 
match our actions but only that they are typically the most probable reaction 
(see Ray & Heyes, 2011). The same process could therefore in principle 
facilitate perception of non-matching reactions in settings where these are 
more likely. For instance, expressions of aggression and dominance (e.g., 
expansive postures) tend to elicit expressions of submission (e.g., constricted 
postures) rather than mirrored aggression (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Under 
this account, any predicted reaction would benefit from the same facilitated 
processing, hence further contributing to smooth and appropriate responses to 
others during social interaction.  
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5.5. Chapter summary 
Experiments 4 and 5 presented evidence that congruent action outcomes 
appear with greater intensity than incongruent events, regardless of whether 
they occur simultaneously with action execution or at a suprasecond delay. This 
pattern is consistent with suggestions that the predictive processes used to 
anticipate the direct consequences of our own actions may support perceptual 
processing of others’ reactions. 
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Chapter 6 – Influences of action on duration perception 
While there are a number of empirical reports consistent with the idea that 
expectations generated on the basis of action are incorporated into perception, 
a notable gap in this literature concerns our perception of time and it remains 
unclear whether sensorimotor predictions influence how we perceive temporal 
features. Interestingly, extant models of time perception make divergent 
predictions about the possibility of such sensorimotor interactions. This 
chapter investigates this issue in a series of psychophysical experiments 
examining whether explicit (Experiments 6 & 7) or implicit (Experiments 8 & 9) 
variation in the duration of executed actions biases duration perception. Across 
all experiments, participants were found to judge auditory tones as longer when 
producing movements of longer duration. Results suggested this effect was due 
to the parameters of executed movements, after controlling for linguistic and 
perceptual confounds. These findings are consistent with the idea that actors 
generate expectations about the likely temporal properties of action outcomes, 
and that these expectations are incorporated into time perception. 
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6.1. Introduction 
Do sensory predictions generated during action influence how temporal 
properties are perceived? In Section 1.2.2 we outlined how it would be adaptive 
for observers to incorporate predictions generated on the basis of action into 
our estimates of the sensory world. There are numerous demonstrations that 
perception of spatial properties and event identity is influenced by predictions 
generated during action. As discussed, these biases toward predicted action 
outcomes may be adaptive, given that expected outcomes are by definition 
more likely and therefore these biases will, on average, generate more veridical 
percepts.  
Such adaptive arguments apply equivalently to the perception of temporal 
features, given that strong correlations between the temporal properties of 
executed movements (e.g. bowing a cello) and the sensory consequences they 
produce (e.g. the duration of the note) could provide a rich source of 
expectations aiding perception. However, existing models of time perception 
make divergent predictions about the possibility of predictive interactions 
between motor and sensory timing (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). Under dedicated 
timing models, temporal information (e.g. the duration of a bowing action, the 
duration of a note) is assumed to be explicitly represented in a format that 
allows interactions in timing across modalities (e.g. Ivry, 1996). In contrast, 
under intrinsic timing models temporal information is only represented 
implicitly, in sensory-specific cortical mechanisms, and in a fashion that 
precludes integration (Buonomano, 2000; Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007; see 
Section 1.4.2.).  
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Previous work has not considered the possible influences of concurrent 
temporal signals on time perception - in action or non-action domains. 
Therefore to investigate whether observers incorporate top-down expectations 
generated during action into time perception, I conducted a series of 
psychophysical experiments where participants judged the duration of an 
auditory tone while concurrently producing movements of varying durations. 
Given the typically strong correlations between the temporal features of actions 
and their perceptual consequences, observers may be expected to incorporate 
temporal information from their actions into their perceptual judgements, 
biasing duration percepts towards concurrent actions. 
In Experiment 6 participants were explicitly instructed to produce long and 
short duration finger taps while judging the duration of a concurrently 
presented tone.  Experiment 7 used a similar design to Experiment 6 while 
controlling for a potential linguistic confound in the movement cuing 
procedure. In Experiment 8, an implicit movement paradigm was used 
(participants reached toward Near or Far targets over a motion-tracker) while 
participants made similar judgements about tone durations. Experiment 9 
mirrored the paradigm used in Experiment 8, controlling for a potential 
perceptual confound in the implicit movement paradigm. 
6.2. Experiment 6 
6.2.1. Methods 
Participants 
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Sixteen participants (nine female, mean age = 24 years, SD = 4.85) were 
recruited from Birkbeck, University of London and paid a small honorarium. 
Four of these acted as replacements for excluded participants where 
performance was highly variable, yielding psychometric functions that could 
not be modelled effectively in at least one condition (see below). The number of 
recruited participants was lower than that in previous studies due to pilot 
testing which indicated that the likely effect size was large, and therefore that 
16 would be sufficient to detect effects.  
Procedure and Stimuli 
Participants were seated approximately 55 cm away from a computer monitor 
inside a dimly lit cubicle, with their right hand positioned over a keypad placed 
in front of the body midline. A black screen prevented participants from viewing 
their right hand. Perceptual judgements were made with the left hand on a 
separate keypad that was positioned to left of the screen covering the right 
hand. The experiment was run using the Cogent toolbox for MATLAB. All visual 
stimuli were presented against a black background on a CRT computer monitor 
(32 x 24 cm, 85 Hz, 21 DPI), while all auditory stimuli were presented over 
Sennheiser HD 201 headphones (81 dB).  
The experiment began with a short block to train participants to produce short 
and long duration movements. Participants depressed the response key with 
the index finger of their right hand, maintaining this position during the inter-
trial interval. On each trial, an ‘S’ or ‘L’ was presented on the screen, indicating 
the required movement duration. The cue remained visible until participants 
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lifted their finger to initiate the movement. After the lift, participants re-pressed 
the response key, attempting to match the criterion movement duration (<500 
ms for short responses, >950 ms for long responses). The movement was 
modelled by the experimenter such that the finger moved smoothly to and from 
the apex of the lift. The training block consisted of 20 trials, ten short and ten 
long. Participants received auditory feedback (100 Hz, 500 ms long) when the 
produced duration was outside the criterion for that trial. Each movement was 
followed by an inter-trial interval of 500 ms, at the end of which the next cue 
appeared.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Time course of stimulus presentation and participant movements on a 
single test trial in Experiments 6 and 7. 
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In the main experimental blocks, participants performed two, interleaved tasks: 
the movement task as described above and a duration discrimination task. The 
time course of the events for each trial is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The trial 
started with the presentation of the duration cue (‘S’ or ‘L’). When participants 
initiated their finger lift, the screen was blanked and the test tone was played. 
The duration of this tone was drawn from a set of seven durations, ranging from 
500 to 950 ms (75 ms steps, all 500 Hz). At a variable delay after participants 
returned their finger to the start position (1000-1500 ms), the reference tone of 
a fixed duration, 725 ms, was played (again 500 Hz). If the cued movement had 
been executed correctly, a response screen appeared instructing participants to 
indicate which tone was longer. The tone judgements were indicated by a 
keypress with the left thumb, pressing the left key if the first tone was longer 
and the right key if the second tone was longer. If the movement duration was 
outside the criterion for that trial, an error message was displayed (‘Too fast!’ or 
‘Too slow!’). No perceptual judgements were obtained on these trials and the 
trial was repeated.  
Participants completed eight practice trials of the concurrent 
movement/duration discrimination task. Test blocks were a minimum of 70 
trials each (five of each target duration for each movement condition) and the 
trial order was randomized. There were two test blocks. Thus, the final data set 
consisted of 10 trials at each test tone duration in which the required 
movement duration was correctly produced.  
When the experiment had been completed, participants were asked whether 
they had noticed anything about the tones, and in particular, anything of note 
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about the second tone. None reported being aware that the reference tone was 
identical in duration on every trial (this same pattern was observed in all 
experiments). 
To estimate psychometric functions, the perceptual judgements for each 
individual were modelled by fitting cumulative Gaussians, and associated pDev 
statistics were calculated to establish the goodness-of fit for each function as in 
previous chapters (Palamedes toolbox, Kingdom & Prins, 2009; See Figure 6.2). 
This procedure was performed separately for the long and short response 
conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Illustration of how PSEs were calculated from cumulative Gaussians 
modelled to judgements in the short and long movement conditions of Experiments 6-
9. The PSE (dotted line) describes the point where participants judge the target and 
reference events to have equal duration. Please note the data points for the two 
conditions overlap for stimulus durations of 575 and 875 ms. 
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6.2.2. Results and Discussion 
Participants had little difficulty producing movements of different durations in 
the two conditions. The mean number of movement errors was 7.7% (SEM = 
1.9%). The mean duration of correct movements was 255.4 ms (SD = 105.9 ms) 
in the short condition, and 1577.5 ms (SD = 521.6 ms) in the long condition 
(Figure 6.3).  
There were no differences between the two movement conditions in terms of 
the precision of the perceptual judgements (t(15) = .678, p = 0.51). The mean 
Weber fractions (precision/duration of the reference stimulus) were .65 (SEM = 
.09) and .70 (SEM = .09) in the Long and Short movement conditions, 
respectively. As can be seen in the example psychometric functions (Figure 6.2), 
participants were more likely to judge the target stimulus as longer on trials 
requiring a long duration movement. This bias results in lower PSE values for 
the long duration movement condition compared to the short duration 
movement condition (Figure 6.3), an effect that was highly significant (t(15) = 
7.82, p < .001, d = 2.21). This PSE effect suggests that duration judgements are 
biased towards the duration of concurrent actions, consistent with a predictive 
interaction between motor and sensory representations of time.  
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Figure 6.3:   A: Distribution of movement times across the conditions of Experiments 6 
-9 collapsed across all participants. B: Mean PSEs in the conditions across experiments. 
Note that lower PSEs indicate a bias to perceive the target stimulus as longer.  Dotted 
line indicates the duration of the reference tone (725 ms). Error bars show 95% 
within-subject confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005). 
6.3. Experiment 7 
The results of Experiment 6 are consistent with the hypothesis that predictions 
are generated during action about the likely duration of subsequent sensory 
events, and that perception is biased towards these expected durations. 
However, there are alternative explanations for the pattern of results obtained.  
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One possibility is that the bias in duration perception described in Experiment 6 
arises due to linguistic rather that motor influences. Each movement condition 
was described in terms of duration, and on each trial, participants saw an 
explicit linguistic cue, ‘L’ to indicate the production of a long duration 
movement and ‘S’ to indicate the production of a short duration movement. It is 
possible that predictions generated on the basis of linguistic representations 
were responsible for the perceptual bias, given that it is well known that 
perception of other low-level features (e.g. visual motion direction) can be 
influenced by linguistic predictions (Francken, Meijs, Hagoort, Gaal, & Lange, 
2015). 
To evaluate this possibility we repeated the basic procedure of Experiment 6, 
but modified the manner in which the movement task was described and cued 
to reduce the linguistic overlap with the perceptual task. In Experiment 7, 
participants were instead instructed to vary the speed (rather than duration) of 
their movements, executing ‘fast’ or ‘slow’ movement in response to onscreen 
cues (‘F’ and ‘S’, respectively). Cuing movement in this manner should reduce 
the linguistic overlap. If the effect described in Experiment 6 is mediated by 
linguistic predictions introduced by ‘long’ and ‘short’ codes, we would expected 
the perceptual biases generated by movement to be abolished in Experiment 7. 
6.3.1. Method 
Participants 
Sixteen new participants (13 female, mean age = 22 years, SD = 3.53) were 
recruited from Birkbeck, University of London. Seven of these were 
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replacements for excluded participants where performance was highly variable, 
yielding psychometric functions that could not be modelled effectively in at 
least one condition.  
Procedure and stimuli 
The stimuli and procedure for Experiment 7 were identical to Experiment 6 
with the following change: participants were instructed to perform ‘slow’ and 
‘fast’ movements, cued with the letters ‘S’ and ‘F’, respectively. The criteria were 
identical to those of Experiment 6: ‘fast’ movements were required to be <500 
ms in duration and ‘slow’ movements were required to be >950 ms in duration. 
6.3.2. Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 6, participants had little difficulty meeting the demands of the 
movement task. The mean durations were 213.4 ms (SD = 103.9 ms) in the 
short condition, and 1644.2 ms (SD = 503.9 ms) in the long condition (Figure 
6.3). Movement errors occurred on 7.1 % (SEM = 2.1 %) of the trials.  
The comparison of the PSEs on the duration perception task again revealed a 
highly significant effect (t(15) = 4.56, p < .001, d = 1.76). The PSEs were lower in 
the slow movement condition relative to the fast condition (see Figure 6.3). As 
in Experiment 1, there was no difference between the movement conditions in 
terms of precision (t(15) = 1.89, p = .078), with mean Weber fractions of .79 
(SEM = .15) and .55 (SEM = .04) in the Slow and Fast conditions, respectively.  
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In sum, the results of Experiment 7 show that tones are perceived to be longer 
when performing long movements, even when the lexical terms used to 
describe movement goals do not directly refer to duration. 
6.4. Experiment 8 
Experiment 7 allows us to reject an explanation of the perceptual bias based on 
the direct influence of linguistic codes (i.e. ‘long’ or ‘short’). However, it remains 
possible that effects are mediated via indirect linguistic links even if the 
conditions were labelled using the terms ‘slow’ and ‘fast’. While adults 
understand time and speed as distinct dimensions, the lexical terms for time 
and speed are related. Moreover, young children tend to confuse these 
dimensions. Interestingly, these confusions reflect the opposite mappings to 
those defined by Newtonian mechanics: for example, faster moving objects are 
erroneously judged to move for longer periods of time (Siegler & Richards, 
1979). As such, if the effect observed in Experiment 7 was mediating by 
linguistic representations the opposite pattern may have been expected i.e. 
longer duration percepts on fast movement trials. 
Nonetheless, concerns about linguistic mediation can be more directly 
addressed by removing the labels entirely from the movement task. To this end, 
we designed a new task for Experiment 8 in which movements of varying 
duration were elicited by implicitly manipulating the other dimension that can 
covary with movement duration, movement distance2(Fitts, 1954). We used a 
simple task in which participants reached to a visual target that could appear at 
                                                        
2 Note that movement duration must of course always covary with either distance, speed or 
both. 
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different locations on the display. By varying the position of the target, 
movements could be partitioned into ‘short’ and ‘long, permitting an analysis of 
whether perceptual judgements differ between the two conditions. This method 
has the important advantage that the instructions are the same for both 
condition (‘reach to the target’), reducing the likelihood that effects are 
linguistically mediated. If similar biasing effect to that observed in Experiments 
6 and 7, it seems more reasonable to attribute the effect to action duration 
rather than the explicit framing of the movement task. 
6.4.1. Method  
Participants 
Sixteen new participants (7 female, mean age = 21.4 years, SD = 2.8) were 
recruited from Birkbeck, University of London and paid a small honorarium for 
participation. Five of these acted as replacements for excluded participants: 
four were excluded because their highly variable performance meant that 
psychometric functions could not be modelled effectively in at least one 
condition. An additional participant was excluded as movement time analysis 
(see below) revealed no differences in movement duration between Near and 
Far target conditions (t = .016, p = .988).  
Procedure and stimuli 
The visual targets were displayed on a vertically-oriented computer monitor 
positioned in front of the participant (Figure 6.4). Vision of the arm was 
occluded by the black screen. Movement position was recorded by a small 
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motion tracker (Leap Motion Controller using the Matleap MATLAB interface, 
sampling rate = 20 Hz – note that this rate was selected during piloting to 
eliminate potential interference with the dynamics of stimulus presentation, yet 
still establish static hand position within 50 ms of arrival at the target location) 
which recorded the centre of the palm in 3D space.  
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Figure 6.4: Illustration of set up in Experiment 8 and 9. A blue circle, presented on a 
vertically-oriented monitor, indicated the target location (defined by distance d and 
angle θ). Target locations were limited to the upper left and right quadrants of space, 
presented at a random angle from 0-45° with respect to the horizontal meridian 
(shown in white).This generated two discontinuous wedges (one left – illustrated, one 
right) in which the targets could appear. Reaches were made by moving the hand 
above and along the horizontal surface of a table where the motion tracker was 
placed. Vision of the hand was occluded by a black screen. On ‘No-Go’ trials in 
Experiment 9, the targets were presented, but participants were required to remain at 
the central starting position. 
126 
 
Each trial began with presentation of cursor feedback (white dot, 0.2° visual 
angle) corresponding to the participant’s palm position. This allowed them to 
verify that their hand was at a central starting position. After 2000 ms, a blue 
target circle (3 cm in diameter, ~ 3 ° visual angle) was presented on the display. 
The location of the target was constrained to fall within one of two 45° wedges 
about the horizontal meridian, with half of the targets appearing to the left and 
half to the right. Participants reached to the target by moving their hand above 
the table surface (without making contact; see Figure 6.4). The instructions 
emphasized accuracy over speed, with participants told to execute a single 
smooth movement, without attempting corrections (given there was no 
movement feedback, corrections would have been infrequent). They were to 
keep their hand at the final location until the end of the trial. Movement time 
was recorded as the interval between movement onset (>1 cm change from 
starting position) and offset (movement velocity<40 mm/s; both criteria were 
set during piloting to maximize the identification of start-stop movement 
periods while minimizing false alarms). If participants failed to complete the 
movement within 3000 ms of the target onset, they received error feedback and 
the trial was repeated. After 5000 ms, the screen was blanked, signalling the 
end of the trial. This was followed by a 2000 ms ITI, during which participants 
were required to move back to the central starting position. The test session 
began with two practice blocks (10 trials each). In the first practice block, 
cursor feedback was continuously provided to familiarize participants with the 
reaching task. This block was followed by a second practice block in which the 
cursor was only visible for 1000 ms at the start of each trial (also the case in the 
main task). Error feedback was provided if the final hand positon was outside 
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the target circle. The error feedback was a red dot (0.2°), indicating the position 
of their palm. 
The test block consisted of 168 trials in which participants concurrently 
performed the reaching and tone duration tasks. The location of the reach 
targets was manipulated such that 70 reaches were to targets positioned 5 – 8 
cm from the start location (Near) and 70 reaches were to targets positioned 15 
– 18 cm from the start location (Far). Pilot testing indicated that with these 
ranges there would be a measureable difference in mean movement time. To 
prevent participants from becoming aware of the clusters of near and far 
targets, we also included an additional 28 trials in which the targets were 10 – 
13 cm from the start location (intermediate).  
A tone was presented as soon as participants initiated the reaching movement. 
As in Experiments 6 and 7, the duration of this tone varied between 500 and 
950 ms (75 ms steps, all 500 Hz). At a random delay after the termination of the 
test tone (1500 – 2000 ms) a second reference tone was presented (725 ms). 
Participants were instructed to complete their movements before the onset of 
the reference tone. Participants were considered to have missed the target if 
they had not reached the target area within 3000 ms of movement initiation. If 
the reach had landed in the target zone within this 3000 ms window, 
participants were required to judge which of the tones was longer, and to move 
back to the central start position after making their judgement. If the target was 
missed, participants received error feedback (red cursor indicating hand 
position) and the trial was repeated at the end of the experiment. Each test tone 
was presented 24 times; 10 times on trials with Near targets, 10 times on trials 
128 
 
with Far targets, and 4 times on trials in which the target was at an 
intermediate location. Trials were randomized and breaks were taken every 20 
trials. Psychometric functions were modelled to responses in Near and Far 
trials as in Experiments 6 and 7. 
6.4.2. Results and Discussion 
Despite the absence of visual feedback, participants were accurate in 
terminating their movements in the target region. The mean number of errors 
was 11.5 % (SEM = 2.3 %). Participants were also successful in terminating 
movements before the reference tone began (mean accuracy = 99.5 %, SEM = 
0.3 %). As can be seen in Figure 3, the movement time distributions showed 
considerable overlap. Nonetheless, the means of the two distributions were 
displaced, indicating that movement time increased with movement amplitude. 
The mean movement times in Near and Far conditions were 619.0 ms (SD = 
267.9 ms) and 859.6 ms (SD = 346.1 ms) respectively. To ensure that our 
distance manipulation was successful for each individual, we compared the MT 
distributions for each participant with a t-test. These tests were all highly 
significant (all ts > 2.87, all ps < .005; bar one excluded participant – see above). 
Thus, our manipulation of distance was effective in creating different timings 
for the Near and Far conditions, even though the temporal difference was much 
smaller than in Experiments 6 and 7. 
Turning to the perceptual judgements, a comparison of PSEs on the duration 
perception task revealed significant differences between the movement 
conditions - t(15) = 7.16, p < .001, d = 1.18. PSEs were significantly lower in the 
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Far (long) target condition relative to Near (short) target condition (see Figure 
6.3), suggesting that tones are perceived to be longer following reaches to more 
distant targets. No significant differences were found in judgement precision – 
t(15) = 1.78, p = .096 - with mean Weber fractions of .54 (SEM = .06) and .46 
(SEM = .04) in the Far and Near conditions, respectively. In line with the 
findings of Experiments 6 and 7, these results suggest that the duration of 
executed movements influences the perceived duration of auditory events. The 
effect is especially striking here given that the duration differences in 
movement time were an emergent property of target distance, and were not 
explicitly marked by the instructions. 
6.5. Experiment 9 
Experiment 8 suggests that biases in perceived duration induced by action 
duration are not driven by explicit labels attached to the movement. However, 
by exploiting the coupling between target eccentricity and movement duration, 
a different confound was introduced into Experiment 8: namely, when 
participants produced reaches with longer duration, they also observed targets 
presented at greater eccentricities from the centre of the screen. It is therefore 
possible that the bias seen in Experiment 8 is driven by the observation of small 
and large visual eccentricities, rather than by the duration of the executed 
movements. 
To evaluate this possibility we used the task employed in Experiment 8 but 
introduced a Go/No-Go manipulation. On each trial a target was presented, but 
movements were only required if the colour of the cursor representing the 
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participant’s initial palm position was green (Go trials); No-Go trials were 
signalled when the cursor was red. If the bias is driven by the perceptual 
difference between Near and Far targets, then similar biases should be 
observed on Go and No-Go trials. Conversely, if the bias is driven by the 
duration of the movements, it should only be observed on Go trials. The task 
was also adapted such that the reference stimulus was presented before the 
target and action stimulus, to ensure that any previous effects were not 
influenced by stimulus order.  
6.5.1. Method 
Participants 
Sixteen new participants (10 female, mean age = 26.1 years, SD =5.3) were 
recruited from Birkbeck, University of London and paid a small honorarium for 
participation. Four of these were replacements for participants excluded 
because their performance yielded psychometric functions that could not be 
modelled effectively in at least one condition. 
Procedure and Stimuli 
The procedure and stimuli used in Experiment 9 were identical to Experiment 8 
with the following changes. As in Experiment 8, each trial began with the 
presentation of cursor feedback corresponding to the participant’s palm 
position. In Experiment 9 the colour of this cursor indicated the movement task 
for the forthcoming trial. On Go trials the cursor was green, indicating that 
participants would be expected to reach to the target. On No-Go trials, the 
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cursor was red and participants were instructed to keep their hand in the 
central starting position. After 2000 ms, the 725 ms reference tone was played. 
At a random delay after the termination of the reference tone (1500 – 2000 ms), 
a blue target circle was presented. On Go trials, this served as the imperative 
and movement initiation triggered the presentation of the test tone. On No-Go 
trials the test tone was presented 500 ms after target onset. This timing was 
selected to approximate the interval between the target and tone onsets in the 
Go conditions (anticipated average RT). By using a fixed interval here, the onset 
of the tone was equally predictable in both conditions. Criteria for successful 
movements on Go trials were identical to Experiment 8, based on the terminal 
position of the hand with respect to the target. Movements greater than 5 cm 
from the start position (in any direction) were considered errors on No-Go 
trials. We opted to use a liberal criterion here since participants’ hands tended 
to drift from the start position given that the hand was suspended in mid-air, 
and pilot testing indicated that the criterion was sufficient to detect erroneous 
reaches.  
The test block consisted of 336 trials. Each test tone was presented 48 times: 20 
times on trials with Near targets, 20 times on trials with Far targets and 8 times 
on trials in which the target was at an intermediate location. Half of the trials 
were Go trials and the other half were No-Go trials. All trial types were 
randomized. Psychometric functions were modelled separately for the four 
conditions, Near-Go, Far-Go, Near-No-Go, Far-No-Go. Breaks were provided 
every 30 trials. 
6.5.2. Results and Discussion 
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Participants were accurate in performing the reaching movements on Go trials, 
with errors occurring on an average of 9.6 % (SEM = 1.35) of trials. As can be 
seen from Figure 6.3, the movement time distributions for the Near and Far 
conditions on Go trials showed considerable overlap. Nonetheless the means of 
the two distributions were displaced, indicating again that movement time 
increased with movement amplitude. The mean movement times for Near and 
Far Go trials were 583.3 ms (SD = 210.0 ms) and 872.9 ms (SD = 298.9 ms). For 
each participant, movement time distributions were compared with a t test. 
These tests were all highly significant (all ts > 5.98, all ps < .001). Thus, the 
manipulation of distance was effective in creating different timings for the Near 
and Far Go conditions, similar to that observed in Experiment 8.  
Judgement precision was analysed using a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, 
with factors of target distance (Near, Far) and task (Go, No-Go). This analysis 
revealed a main effect of task, F(1,15) = 16.18, p = .001, ηp2 = .519, with better 
discrimination performance in No-Go conditions relative to Go conditions. This 
effect is expected given that participants are simultaneously performing a 
motor task when judging the tones in the Go, but not No-Go condition. No other 
effects were significant (all p > .058). Mean Weber fractions of .41 (SEM = .04) 
and .50 (SEM = .07) were obtained for Near and Far trials in the Go condition, 
while Weber fractions of .26 (SEM = .02) and .31 (SEM = .03) were obtained for 
Near and Far trials in the No-Go condition.  
The PSEs (now derived from cumulative Gaussians modelled to P[respond 
‘second longer’] against test duration) were also analysed using a repeated 
measures ANOVA with the same factorial structure. This analysis found no 
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effect of task (p = .632) or target distance (p = .385), but a significant interaction 
between these factors, F(1,15) = 11.27, p = .004, ηp2 = .429. Simple effects 
analyses revealed a cross-over interaction: In the Go condition, PSEs were lower 
for Far targets compared to Near targets, t(15) = 2.29, p = .037, d = .444, while 
in the No-Go conditions, PSEs were lower for Near targets than Far targets, 
t(15) = 2.69, p = .017, d = .329. Therefore, as in the previous experiments, the 
tones were perceived to be longer following reaches to more distant targets. 
Unexpectedly, the opposite effect was observed in the No-Go condition, with 
short target locations associated with longer perceived tone durations. This 
reverse effect may reflect the inhibition of movement on these trials. Previous 
work has shown that withholding movements can bias perception away from 
associated spatial features (e.g., when planning a leftward movement, stimuli 
appearing during the preparatory period are biased to appear rightwards from 
their actual position; Kirsch & Kunde, 2014). Our reversed effect in the No-Go 
condition could reflect an analogous effect on temporal features, where 
inhibiting movements that would have a particular duration biases perception 
away from intervals associated with those actions. We also note that the bias 
observed on Go trials in Experiment 9 had a reduced effect size, relative to that 
observed in Experiments 6-8. Speculatively, this could reflect residual inhibition 
from No-Go trials. 
In line with Experiments 6-8, the results of Experiment 9 therefore indicate that 
the duration of an executed movement influences the perceived duration of 
concurrent auditory events. Importantly, the fact that this bias was absent when 
participants observed targets but were not required to move underscores that 
134 
 
the effect is driven by the properties of executed movements rather than spatial 
properties of the target. 
6.6. General discussion 
Experiments 6-9 demonstrate that auditory duration judgements are strongly 
biased by the duration of concurrent executed movements. In Experiments 6 
and 7, participants performed two concurrent temporal tasks where they were 
required to regulate the duration (Experiment 6) or speed (Experiment 7) of a 
movement. These experiments revealed a strong biasing effect of the executed 
movement on perceptual duration judgements. Explicit temporal requirements 
were eliminated from the movement task in Experiments 8 and 9, with a 
manipulation of movement amplitude instead used to elicit duration 
differences. The effect of action duration on perceived duration persisted, albeit 
attenuated in comparison to Experiments 6 and 7. Taken together, the results 
demonstrate a novel influence of action on duration perception. 
The action-induced bias describes in these experiments joins an existing canon 
of empirical effects where action has been shown to influence the perceived 
timing of events (Merchant & Yarrow, 2016). For example, it is well established 
in the intentional binding paradigm that a delayed sound is perceived as closer 
in time to a keypress when it reliably follows the action (Haggard et al., 2002). 
The present findings extend this literature by showing that temporal features of 
action influence the perceived duration of sensory events in an isomorphic 
fashion – such that sensory durations are perceived to be more similar to 
executed actions. This isomorphic feature of the effect is more consistent with 
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dedicated timing models which assume that temporal information is 
represented in explicit metrics in a manner that could support integration 
across modalities (Ivry, 1996) and are harder to reconcile with the idea that 
timing across action and perception depends on implicit representations that 
are encapsulated from each other (Buonomano, 2000).  
The results of Experiments 6-9 are reminiscent of predictive effects of action in 
other perceptual domains, such as reports that perception of visual motion 
(Wohlschläger, 2000) and action identity (Di Pace & Saracini, 2014) are biased 
in line with concurrent actions. As such, the temporal bias identified in these 
experiments is consistent with the idea that actors incorporate expectations 
generated on the basis of movement into their perceptual estimates, in line with 
normative accounts of prediction found in sensory cognition (Yuille & Kersten, 
2006) and the suggestion that expectations bias sensory populations towards 
expected outcomes (Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). For example, when 
participants produce longer actions, predictions may act to increase the gain on 
units associated with longer durations, biasing the sensory population response 
in line with expectations. Importantly, while such a mechanism induces 
perceptual distortions when actions and outcomes are uncorrelated – as in this 
experimental setting – such predictive biasing may be adaptive in our typical 
sensory environment where the temporal features of actions and outcomes are 
highly correlated, and where perceptual shifts toward expected durations 
generate more veridical percepts. 
The idea that an adaptive integration mechanism can sometimes produce biases 
is reminiscent of findings in the multisensory perception literature where 
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participants integrate signals across different modalities. For example, 
judgements about the spatial location of an auditory stimulus are often biased 
towards concurrent visual signals (Alais & Burr, 2004). Interestingly, such 
integration across modalities has been shown to depend on a ‘causal inference’ 
that the two sensory signals have arisen from the same source. For example, 
Körding et al. (2007) found that increasing the spatial disparity between 
auditory and visual signals reduced the influence that visual information has on 
auditory localisation judgements, and this effect could be accounted for by a 
model that used the spatial disparity between events to infer the likelihood both 
signals arose from a common cause.   
It may be interesting to consider whether the effects reported in this chapter 
rely on an analogous inference that sensory effects (tones) are indeed caused by 
the executed actions. A strong version of this account is perhaps unlikely given 
the patterns across the experiments. Specifically, discrepancies between actions 
and stimulus durations (which may prevent inferences of a common cause) 
were largest in Experiments 6 and 7, but these conditions also yielded the 
largest action-induced biases. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to examine 
in future work how the predictive integration of information across sensory and 
motor channels may depend on beliefs about the causal structure of the sensory 
environment.  
6.7. Chapter summary 
To date the literature on sensory prediction has largely neglected influences on 
temporal processing, with dedicated and intrinsic models making divergent 
137 
 
predictions about the possibility of predictive interactions. The results of 
Experiments 6-9 suggest that duration perception is biased toward the duration 
of executed actions, in line with dedicated timing models and consistent with 
the idea that expectations generated during action are incorporated into 
duration percepts.   
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Chapter 7 – Are predictive influences of action on duration 
perception biologically-tuned? 
Chapter 6 reported a series of experiments that found auditory duration 
judgements were influenced by the temporal properties of concurrent actions. 
This chapter presents a preliminary investigation into the nature of the 
mechanism generating this effect. An influential hypothesis from Schubotz and 
colleagues proposes that the motor system influences perception of the physical 
environment using predictive mechanisms that are primarily adapted for 
processing biological action outcomes. An important prediction of this account 
is that influences of action on perception should be stronger for biological 
action outcomes than ‘inanimate’ nonbiological events. This hypothesis is 
considered in Experiment 10. Here participants completed a task (adapted from 
Experiment 7) where participants produced mouth movements of short and 
long durations, and made judgements about the duration of concurrently 
presented sounds. In separate blocks, participants either rated natural speech 
sounds (a biological event) or artificial triangle waves (a nonbiological event). 
Results replicated the action-induced bias described in Chapter 6, with 
participants rating sounds to be longer when they produced longer duration 
movements. However, contrary to the predictions of Schubotz and colleagues, 
no biological tuning was observed – with participants showing equivalent 
biases when judging speech and triangle waves. The results are more consistent 
with the idea that the motor system generates general predictions about 
features of the sensory environment that influence perceptual processing of 
both action and non-action events. 
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7.1. Introduction 
Experiments 6-9 reported evidence that auditory duration judgements were 
strongly influenced by concurrently executed actions, such that tones were 
perceived to be longer when participants executed longer movements.  Such 
findings are consistent with the idea that observers incorporate top-down 
expectations generated on the basis of action into their perceptual estimates, 
which may be adaptive given that expected events are by definition more likely 
to occur (Yuille & Kersten, 2006). However, while there are indeed strong 
correlations between temporal features of executed actions and the perceptual 
consequences which ensue, in Experiments 6-9 participants performed actions 
with their fingers or hands while judging pure tones. Given that it is unlikely 
that participants have much experience of producing actions and experiencing 
pure tones of similar durations, how do these effects arise? 
A candidate answer is offered by Schubotz and colleagues (Schubotz, Kalinich & 
von Cramon, 2004; Schubotz, 2007) who suggest that the motor system is able 
to generate predictions about a variety of events in the external world using 
models that are primarily tuned to biological action outcomes. In particular, it is 
assumed that when we are required to generate expectations about inanimate 
(non-action) events in the environment we repurpose models that are used to 
generate predictions about perceptually similar action events e.g. we may use 
predictive models about the visual consequences of arm motion if we are 
required to passively predict the trajectory of a crashing wave, given that 
biological motion somewhat resembles the motion of the wave. 
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Evidence that the motor system is engaged during the passive prediction of 
inanimate sensory events is provided by neuroimaging studies. For example, 
fMRI studies reveal that when participants perform a task that requires 
predicting spatial, object (e.g. shape) or temporal patterns in a sequence of 
geometric shapes (in the absence of any requirement to move), specific regions 
of the premotor cortex are activated as a function of sequence dimension 
(Schubotz, Kalinich & von Cramon, 2004; Schubotz, 2007). For example, regions 
of the dorsal premotor cortex are activated for spatial sequences, superior 
ventral premotor cortex for object sequences and inferior ventral regions for 
temporal sequences (Schubotz, von Cramon, & Lohmann, 2003; Wolfensteller, 
Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2007). This pattern of data is interpreted as consistent 
with Schubotz’s model given that motor representations involved in the 
execution of arm, hand and vocal movements lie in dorsal, superior ventral and 
inferior ventral premotor regions (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002), respectively, 
and the perceptual consequences of our actions principally vary in space, shape 
and time. The model provided by Schubotz could account for the findings of 
Experiments 6-9, if it is assumed that predictive models used to anticipate 
typical biological consequences of our movements are used to generate 
predictions about the inanimate stimuli used in these paradigms (pure tones).  
However, an alternative possibility is that agents possess predictive models of 
how their actions influence general dimensions of the sensory environment (e.g. 
event duration) in addition to those models used to anticipate biological action 
outcomes, and it is these more general predictive mechanisms that are 
responsible for action-induced biases when perceiving inanimate stimuli. Press 
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and Cook (2015) have noted that the motor system contains representations of 
actions at different levels of abstraction (e.g. from movement position and 
duration in the primary motor cortex to more complex representations of 
effector configuration in the premotor cortex). Given that it is often assumed 
that sensorimotor predictions about animate action outcomes (e.g. observing 
hand grasps after executing hand grasps) reflect interactions between motor 
and sensory representation at similar levels of abstraction (e.g. premotor areas 
coding for configural features of grasping movements sending predictions to 
regions of superior temporal sulcus involved in the perception of grasping 
movements; Kilner et al., 2007), it is therefore possible that both animate and 
inanimate events are influenced by sensorimotor predictions at these more 
general levels. 
More generic sensorimotor predictions about temporal information could be 
acquired through statistical learning about the relationships between executed 
actions and their typical animate and inanimate consequences. As shown in 
Figure 7.1, early in development, agents may possess separate representations 
of sensory and motor time that are weakly and non-systemically connected. 
However, given the natural correlation between the duration of executed 
actions and the perceptual consequences that are produced, we may acquire 
predictive associations between particular motor units and sensory units.  
Importantly, both animate (e.g. observed biological motion) and inanimate 
action outcomes (e.g. the duration of played musical notes) exhibit correlations 
with movement duration. It is precisely under these conditions, where the 
duration of biological and non-biological action outcomes are correlated 
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similarly with action duration, that learning theorists predict the acquisition of 
predictions that generalise across biological and non-biological inputs (Pearce, 
1987).  Once such predictions have been acquired, activation of the motor unit 
through action execution biases its associated sensory units. Such associative 
activation of expected sensory units through action as described in Figure 7.1 
would generate the effect described in Chapter 6 – namely that duration 
perception will be biased towards the duration of executed actions.  
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Figure 7.1: A schematic illustration of how sensorimotor associations may be forged 
through statistical learning. A) Early in life, we may have representations of time in 
both motor and sensory domains, with no systematic connections between them. B) 
However after experiencing the natural statistics of the environment – where the 
duration of an action is typically similar to the duration of the perceptual consequences 
it produces – we have the opportunity to learn ‘matching’ associations between motor 
and sensory duration representations (indicated by thicker connecting lines). These 
predictive associations would subsequently cause motor activity (e.g. during action 
execution) to propagate to sensory units, biasing perceptual activity toward similar 
durations. 
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A key prediction of Schubotz’s ‘repurposing’ model is that the degree to which a 
sensory event benefits from motor prediction depends on the degree to which it 
resembles a biological action outcome (Schubotz, 2007), and that influences on 
perceptual processing are therefore strongest for biological outcomes relative 
to inanimate events. However, if agents possess more generic sensorimotor 
models about stimulus duration as a consequence of statistical learning as 
outlined above, then similar influences of action should be seen for the 
perception of biological and inanimate events. Experiment 10 was conducted to 
explore these contrasting predictions, investigating whether the effects of 
action execution on duration perception identified in Chapter 6 reflect the 
operation of a predictive mechanism primarily adapted to biological action 
outcomes. The paradigm used was modelled on that of Experiment 7 with two 
principal changes. The first change was that participants produced ‘fast’ or 
‘slow’ movements with their mouths rather than fingers – as Schubotz and 
colleagues suggest premotor representations of the articulatory system are 
most strongly involved in generating temporal predictions (Schubotz & von 
Cramon, 2002). (NB: While adopting this explicit movement paradigm has some 
potential methodological concerns that are allayed by the implicit motion 
tracking task used in Experiments 8 and 9 [e.g. possible linguistic contributions 
of terms ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ to the observed effects, see Section 6.3], practical 
difficulties associated with tracking mouth movements and manipulating their 
duration implicitly through a secondary task made incorporating these 
elements into Experiment 10 infeasible.)   The second change was that 
participants no longer made judgements about pure tones, but instead made 
judgements about the duration of speech sounds or triangle waves. The 
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selection of these two stimulus types permits assessment of whether predictive 
effects on perception are larger for biological outcomes (speech) or non-
biological outcomes (non-speech), given that triangle waves cannot be 
produced by biological systems. 
7.2. Experiment 10 
7.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Sixteen participants (12 female, mean age = 23.9 years, SD = 4.2) were recruited 
from Birkbeck, University of London and paid a small honorarium. Five of these 
acted as replacements for excluded participants where performance was highly 
variable, yielding psychometric functions that could not be modelled effectively 
in at least one condition (see below).   
Procedure and Stimuli 
The procedure of Experiment 10 was identical to Experiment 7 with the 
following changes (see Fig. 7.2). Participants began each trial with their lips 
depressing a custom-made response key (Heijo Research Electronics) which 
was mounted on an adjustable stand at the participant’s mouth height. To 
produce movements of different target durations (<500 ms or >950 ms) 
participants released and then depressed the key for the target interval – 
opening their mouths as a result. In the main experiment the key release 
triggered the presentation of a target duration stimulus that was drawn from a 
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seven-point psychophysical continuum ranging from 500 to 950 ms in duration 
(75 ms steps).  
In Biological blocks, the test stimulus was the open back unrounded vowel (/a/) 
produced by a male native English speaker (frequency = 117 Hz). This vowel 
sound is that typically produced by vocalisations with an open mouth, 
unrounded lips and without the involvement of the tongue i.e. the articulatory 
action performed by participants when releasing the key. The test continuum 
was created by taking an original recording of the spoken vowel sound and 
manipulating the duration contour of this sound in the speech analysis software 
Praat (Boersma, 2001). This manipulation alters the duration of the sound but 
leaves its pitch unaffected. In Nonbiological blocks, the test stimulus was a 
triangle wave produced using the sound-editing software Audacity (frequency = 
100 Hz). Following a variable delay ISI (1000-1500 ms) after participant 
completed their mouth movement, participants were presented with a 
reference stimulus with a duration of 725 ms (midpoint of the test continuum). 
Participants then judged whether the first or second sound was longer in 
duration. 
Participants completed 280 trials, split into two blocks with Biological or 
Nonbiological stimuli (140 each, order counterbalanced across participants). 
Psychometric functions were modelled to participant responses as in 
Experiment 7, separately for each combination of movement and stimulus 
condition. As a manipulation check, at the end of the experiment participants 
completed computerised scales where they were presented with a test stimulus 
from the Biological and Nonbiological condition (order counterbalanced) and 
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were asked to clicking on a rating scale from 1 to10 (‘Not at all’ to ‘Very Much’) 
‘How much was that sound like human speech?’ and ‘How much was that sound 
like your speech?’. 
 
Figure 7.2: Time course of stimulus presentation and participant movements on a 
single test trial in Experiment 10. 
 
7.2.2. Results  
Human-like and self-like ratings for Biological (speech) and Nonbiological 
(triangle wave) stimuli were compared using repeated measures t-tests. Both 
tests revealed that participants rated the Biological stimuli as more like human 
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speech (mean rating = 8.74, SEM = .265) than the Nonbiological stimuli (mean 
rating = .289, SEM = .12424, t(15) = 28.72, p<.001) and that the Biological 
speech stimuli also sounded more like their own speech (mean rating = 5.24, 
SEM = .704) than the Nonbiological stimuli (mean =.234,  SEM= .086, t(15) = 
7.11, p<.001). These results suggest that participants perceive robust 
differences between the identity of the stimuli, and importantly that processing 
steps used to manipulate Biological stimuli did not cause them to appear 
unnatural. 
Participants were successful in generating movements of different durations in 
the two conditions. The mean number of movement errors was 13.6 % (SEM = 
1.6%). The mean duration of correct movement was 234.9 ms (SD = 109.9 ms) 
on fast movement trials and 1591.4 ms (SD = 333.9 ms) on slow movement 
trials. As illustrated in Figure 7.3., comparable differences between fast and 
slow movement times were obtained in both stimulus blocks. 
Precision and PSE values were analysed in separate repeated measures 
ANOVAs with factors of Movement (Fast, Slow) and Stimulus (Biological, 
Nonbiological). The precision analyses revealed no significant effects (all 
p>.104).  However, the PSE analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
Movement – F(1, 15) = 19.201, p=.001, ηp2= .561) – which reflected the fact that 
PSEs were significantly lower (i.e. tones were judged to be longer) in the Slow 
movement condition (mean = 687.6 ms , SEM = 19.28) relative to the Fast 
movement condition (mean = 787.6 ms, SEM = 12.6), replicating the results of 
Chapter 6 . No significant main effect of Stimulus (p=.261) or interaction 
between Stimulus and Movement (p=.131) was found. 
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To investigate whether the lack of interaction reflected support for the null 
hypothesis we compared the magnitude of the PSE biases in each stimulus 
condition using a Bayesian t-test in JASP with an identical factorial structure. 
This test evaluated a one-tailed hypothesis (i.e. biological PSE effect> 
nonbiological PSE effect) given the directional prediction of Schubotz’s model 
that predictive influences on perception should be more pronounced for 
biological than nonbiological stimuli. This analysis revealed a BF+0 =  0.113, 
suggesting ~8.9 times more evidence for the null hypothesis that PSE effects 
between stimulus conditions do not differ.  
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Figure 7.3: Top Panel: Histograms showing movement times in the across all 
conditions of Experiment 10 collapsed across all subjects. Bottom Panel: Mean PSEs 
across all conditions of Experiment 10. Lower PSEs indicate a tendency to the rate the 
test stimulus as longer relative to the comparison. Error-bars display 95% within-
participant confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005). 
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7.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 10 replicates and extend the results of Experiment 6-9, showing 
that the perceived duration of auditory events is biased towards the duration of 
executed mouth movements, such that sounds were judged to be longer when 
movements were longer in duration. Experiment 10 also found convincing 
evidence against a Movement x Stimulus interaction, suggesting that action-
induced biases were equivalent when participants judged biological speech 
sounds and nonbiological triangle waves. This contrasts with models which 
suggest that predictive effects of action on perception arise through 
mechanisms that are primarily tuned to biological action outcomes (Schubotz, 
2007), but is consistent with the possibility that agents possess generic 
sensorimotor models concerning temporal information. 
A critic of this interpretation could query whether this null result reflects an 
absence of biological tuning, or a failure to effectively generate apparently 
biological and nonbiological stimuli. Researchers have suggested that explicit 
beliefs about the animacy of an observed stimulus (i.e. whether it was an action 
produced by an intentional agent) modulate the degree to which such events 
recruit motor processes. For example, the same dot motion stimulus interferes 
less with movement execution when participants believe it to be generated by a 
computer rather than a human (Stanley, Gowen, & Miall, 2007) and participants 
show reduced imitation of identical hand actions they believe to be non-human 
in origin (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; though see Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2006).  
As such, if speech and non-speech sounds were both judged to be ‘inanimate’ in 
origin (e.g. given the digital manipulation of speech sounds) any biological 
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tuning effects may not be observed. However, given that participants robustly 
judged the speech sounds as being of human origin and the non-speech sounds 
as non-human, this alternative explanation is not compelling. It is also worth 
noting that a recent meta-analysis has suggested there is little evidence for 
effects of animacy beliefs on laboratory imitation tasks (Cracco et al., in press), 
which may bear on the present findings insofar as imitation and sensorimotor 
prediction reflect related mechanisms (Kilner et al., 2007;Wolpert et al., 2003). 
These results are more consistent with the idea that the motor system 
generates top-down predictions about general sensory features (Press & Cook, 
2015) that equivalently influence perception of animate and inanimate events. 
For example, agents may generate sensory predictions about these more 
generic perceptual dimensions, with a granularity (e.g. ‘long duration’) that 
allows such predictions to apply equally to biological and nonbiological action 
outcomes.  Under this account it is not necessary to assume that one has had 
specific experience of experiencing (e.g.) tones or triangle waves when 
producing movements to explain these perceptual effects. Rather, it is assumed 
that the temporal predictions one acquires through sensorimotor experience 
with one’s own body and physical environment are forged at a level of 
abstraction that allows them to generalise across input domains (Pearce, 1987).  
 
7.3. Chapter Summary 
Experiment 10 found equivalent biases of concurrent action duration on the 
perceived duration of biological (speech) and nonbiological (triangle wave) 
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stimuli. These results are difficult to reconcile with the idea that predictions 
about inanimate features of the environment arise by repurposing mechanisms 
primarily adapted to biological outcomes, but are consistent with the idea that 
agents may acquire generic sensorimotor predictions as a consequence of 
statistical learning. 
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Chapter 8 – Do predictive influences of action on duration 
perception arise through statistical learning? 
Chapter 6 found that auditory duration judgements were biased towards the 
duration of concurrent executed actions – consistent with a predictive influence 
of action on perception. Chapter 7 investigated the possibility that these effects 
are generated by mechanisms primarily tuned to biological action outcomes, 
but found no evidence for biological tuning. Results were instead consistent 
with an alternative explanation: that action influences duration perception 
through domain-general sensorimotor predictions acquired on the basis of 
statistical learning. Chapter 8 presents a preliminary investigation into this 
statistical learning by interrogating one of its key predictions:that the influences 
of action on perception should depend on the experienced contingencies 
between actions and outcomes, and should be recalibrated when these 
contingencies change. This prediction is investigated in Experiment 11 by 
examining whether altering contingencies between executed actions and 
perceptual outcomes recalibrates action-induced perceptual biases. 
Participants completed a task modelled on the paradigm used in Experiment 9 
over four testing sessions. Over the two middle sessions participants were 
exposed to a sensorimotor contingency that either reflected the natural 
statistics of the environment (e.g. where long duration movements were paired 
with long duration outcomes – the Congruent training group) or where the 
natural mapping between actions and outcomes was reversed (e.g. where long 
duration movements were paired with short duration outcomes – the 
Incongruent training group). Pre- to post-test comparisons revealed that 
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incongruent, but not congruent, sensorimotor experience abolishes the action-
induced bias, consistent with the idea that the underlying mechanism tracks the 
statistical relationships between executed actions and perceptual outcomes. 
8.1. Introduction 
Thus far this thesis has presented a novel temporal influence of action on 
perception, where the perceived duration of an auditory event was biased 
toward the duration of executed actions (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 investigated 
whether this effect was generated by generalising models tuned to biological 
action outcomes to the prediction of inanimate events – finding negative results. 
One alternative possibility entertained was that agents generate ‘domain-
general’ predictions about the relationship between actions and outcomes, and 
these sensorimotor predictions generalise across biological and nonbiological 
stimulus domains (Pearce, 1987). This possibility is investigated in this chapter.  
A venerable tradition in experimental psychology has emphasised that action 
control depends on learning the relationship between performed actions and 
perceived outcomes by tracking the statistics of the environment (James, 1890). 
For example, research in the ideomotor literature has found that experiencing 
contingencies between actions (e.g. a particular key press) and outcomes (e.g. a 
pure tone of a particular frequency) can forge sensorimotor associations - such 
that actual (Elsner & Hommel, 2001) and anticipated action outcomes (Kunde, 
Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004) can prime their associated actions in reaction time 
tasks. It has been proposed that sensorimotor learning generates ‘automatic 
imitation’ effects, whereby participants are faster to execute hand actions when 
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observing the same action executed by task-irrelevant hand (Brass, Bekkering, 
& Prinz, 2001; Heyes, 2011). Brass and Heyes (2005) propose that such effects 
reflect the fact that we have vast amounts of sensorimotor experience that 
allows us to develop statistical associations between ‘doing’ and ‘seeing’.  For 
example, when we send the motor command to open a hand there is a high 
probability that we will observe an opening hand (and amongst all observed 
actions, the congruent action is conditionally most probable). These 
associations acquired in the natural environment therefore bias action selection 
in the same fashion as the ‘arbitrary’ associations acquired during laboratory 
training (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). 
A powerful way to test statistical learning accounts is to investigate whether 
sensorimotor interactions are altered when the statistical relationship between 
actions and outcomes is manipulated. For example, in a series of experiments 
Heyes and colleagues (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014) have shown 
the automatic imitation effect can be abolished after participants are given 
incongruent sensorimotor experience of ‘counter-imitation’  - where 
participants execute an action (e.g. hand opening) in the presence of an 
incongruent observed action (e.g. hand closing, (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & 
Haggard, 2005).  Similar effects are seen with neuroimaging measures, where 
incongruent sensorimotor experience of producing hand/foot movements when 
observing foot/hand movements has been shown to reverse the pattern of 
‘mirror’ responses in the premotor cortex evoked during passive action 
observation (Catmur et al., 2008). Furthermore, similar incongruent experience 
of observing index/little finger abduction movements while executing 
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little/index movements reverses the pattern of muscle-evoked potentials 
elicited through TMS during action observation (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 
2007). 
A similar form of statistical learning could furnish the mechanisms generating 
the action-induced perceptual biases described here (see Section 7.1.) An 
important feature of this statistical learning account is the assumption that 
action biases perception toward similar perceived durations solely because 
actors experience a strong correlation between action durations and perceptual 
durations that are similar. Nothing, in principle, prevents the acquisition of 
‘non-matching’ associations, where actors learn to expect that short actions can 
be followed by long durations, or vice versa, other than statistics of the 
environment.  As illustrated in Figure 8.1.c, the statistical learning account 
would predict that an individual who receives this kind of incongruent 
sensorimotor experience should acquire additional non-matching associations. 
As a result, one would predict that after this kind of incongruent experience 
action execution (e.g. production of a short action) would activate competing 
sensory units (e.g. the first-learned ‘short’ sensory units, alongside the second-
learned ‘long’ sensory code). This kind of learning would therefore be expected 
to abolish action-induced perceptual biases, as increases in sensory activation 
will be symmetric across the sensory population. In particular, this kind of 
second-learned association would not be expected to extinguish the first-
learned association, given that extinction of learning operates over vast time 
scales (if it occurs at all; Baeyens, Eelen, & Crombez, 1995). Relatedly, it has 
been shown that second-learned associations acquired in sensorimotor tasks 
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demonstrate specificity to the contexts in which they are trained (Cook, 
Dickinson, & Heyes, 2012). 
Experiment 11 was conducted to investigate this prediction. Participants 
completed the simultaneous reaching and duration judgement task described in 
Experiment 8 in four sessions spread over two consecutive days. During the 
first and last sessions participants completed an identical task to that described 
in Experiment 8. In the middle sessions (second and third) participants 
received sensorimotor training. One group of participants received congruent 
sensorimotor experience, such that when they reached towards near and far 
targets (producing shorter / longer movements) they heard shorter and longer 
tones, respectively. A second group of participants received incongruent 
sensorimotor experience, such that when they reached towards near and far 
targets (producing shorter / longer movements) they heard longer and shorter 
tones, respectively.  Under a statistical learning account, participants should 
show attenuated action-induced perceptual biases after incongruent 
experience, while biases in participants receiving congruent experience should 
remain intact. 
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Figure 8.1: A schematic illustration of how sensorimotor associations may be forged 
through statistical learning. Panels A and B are identical to Figure 7.1, indicating the 
putative associations acquired by an agent before and after experiment typical 
sensorimotor contingencies (e.g. longer actions = longer sensory consequences). Panel 
C illustrates that if an individual subsequently experiences an incongruent 
sensorimotor contingency (e.g. here where 500 ms actions produce 800 ms effects, and 
vice versa), a statistical learning account would predict the acquisition of addition non-
matching associations that compete with those ‘first-acquired’ associations. It is this 
kind of experience that is provided in Experiment 11’s Incongruent condition. 
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8.2. Experiment 11 
8.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants (24 female, mean age = 24.8 years, SD = 5.5) were 
recruited from Birkbeck, University of London and paid a small honorarium. 
Four of these acted as replacements for excluded participants where 
performance was highly variable, yielding psychometric functions that could 
not be modelled effectively in at least one condition.  Sixteen participants each 
were randomly allocated to the Congruent and Incongruent training groups.  
Procedure and Stimuli 
Participants completed four sessions of the paradigm described in Experiment 
8, split over two consecutive days. The first and last of these sessions 
respectively formed the Pre-Test and Post-Test blocks, were identical for both 
training groups and had an identical procedure to that described in Experiment 
8. 
The second and third sessions formed the Training blocks. These were identical 
to Experiment 8 apart from the following change. In the Incongruent training 
group, Near Target trials were always accompanied by the longest test tone 
(950 ms) and Far Target trials were always accompanied by the shortest test 
tone (500 ms).  These sensorimotor contingencies are inconsistent with those 
typically experienced in the natural environment, and provide the opportunity 
to learn competing sensorimotor predictions. In the Congruent training group, 
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Near Target trials were always accompanied by the shortest test tone (500 ms) 
and Far Target trials were always accompanied by the longest test tone (950 
ms). This sensorimotor contingency roughly corresponds to the natural 
environment, where short/long actions are associated with short/long sensory 
outcomes and acted as a control condition.  Both conditions also had 16.7 % of 
Intermediate Target trials as in Experiment 8, and in both groups these targets 
were accompanied by the midpoint of the tone continuum (725 ms). 
Participants completed the same task as that undertaken during Pre and Post-
Test – judging which of the two presented tones was longer in duration. 
Psychometric functions were modelled to participant responses in the Pre-Test 
and Post-Test sessions as in Experiment 8 to establish whether the effect was 
replicated in both training groups before training was administered, and to 
investigate whether the nature of the perceptual bias changed between groups. 
8.2.2. Results  
Precision and PSE values were analysed using two separate 2 x 2 x 2 mixed 
ANOVAs with the between-participants factor of Training Group (Congruent, 
Incongruent) and the within-participants factors of Time (Pre-Test, Post-Test) 
and Movement Condition (Near Target, Far Target).  While no significant effects 
were found in the precision analysis, the PSE analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of Movement  Condition– F(1, 30) = 73.6, p<.001, ηp2= .710 – 
alongside a significant two-way interaction between Movement and Time - F(1, 
30) = 8.522, p=.007, ηp2= .221 – and a significant three-way interaction between 
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Training Group, Time and Movement Condition  - F(1,30) = 7.85, p=.009, ηp2 = 
.207. 
The main effect of Movement Condition reflected the fact that across all 
conditions PSEs were lower when participants produced movements to Far 
targets (mean = 664.5 ms, SEM = 9.8) compared to Near targets (mean = 727.2 
ms, SEM = 10.1), replicating the finding that participants are biased to judge 
tones to be longer when they produce movements with longer durations.  
To break down the obtained interactions separate 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVAs with factors of Time and Movement condition were conducted for each 
Training Group. In the Congruent training group no interaction between Time 
and Movement Condition was observed (p=.929), while in the Incongruent 
training group this interaction was significant  - F(1,15) = 14.25, p=.002, ηp2= 
.487. This interaction in the Incongruent group reflected the fact that while pre-
training PSEs were lower in the Far target condition than the Near target 
condition – t(15) = 7.37, p<.001 – this difference was markedly attenuated post-
training, with PSEs which no longer differing significantly between conditions 
(p=.078; see Figure 8.2). 
This pattern of results is consistent with the idea that incongruent sensorimotor 
experience can recalibrate predictive relationships between motor and sensory 
representations of time, such that second-learned associations can abolish 
action-induced perceptual biases.  
163 
 
 
Figure 8. 2: Mean PSEs across all conditions of Experiment 11. Lower PSEs indicate a 
tendency to rate the test stimulus as longer relative to the comparison. Error-bars 
display 95% within-participant confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
8.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 11 found that a short period of incongruent sensorimotor 
experience – where participants produced long actions and perceived stimuli 
with a short duration (and vice versa) – was sufficient to abolish action-induced 
biases on duration perception. Perceptual biases did not decrease in magnitude 
after congruent sensorimotor experience; suggesting that this effect is unlikely 
to reflect generic effects of practice with the task. Instead, these results are 
consistent with the idea that the mechanism responsible for the perceptual bias 
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tracks the statistical relationship between actions and outcomes (Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Hommel et al., 2001). This result is particularly important, as it 
suggests that the underlying mechanism is predictive in the psychological sense 
– generating influences based on what is conditionally probable (Shea, 2015; 
see Section 1.1.). 
One potential limitation in the design of Experiment 11 is that the training 
manipulation introduces confounded statistical associations between perceived 
durations, action durations and target distances. For example, during 
Incongruent training participants were consistently exposed to Far targets 
(circles at large eccentricities) and short test tones (500 ms). While this 
provides the opportunity to learn new statistical relationships between action 
durations and tone durations (e.g. long movement, short tone), it is also 
possible that participants learn the relationship between target locations and 
tone durations (e.g. far target, short tone), and that these purely sensory 
expectations induce competing perceptual biases at post-test. The possibility 
that purely sensory learning accounts for the effect of training in the 
Incongruent group may seem unlikely given the pattern of results seen in the 
Congruent group. In particular, this form of sensory learning should also occur 
during congruent training, and should lead to the acquisition of sensory 
expectations that exaggerate (rather than compete with) the perceptual bias in 
this group. Evidence for this was not obtained given that perceptual biases after 
congruent training were not significantly increased. Nonetheless, this remains 
an important issue for future research, and could be resolved in a paradigm 
where participants undergo incongruent sensorimotor experience but do not 
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produce actions at post-test (cf. No-Go condition, Experiment 9). If acquired 
sensory predictions drive the training effect it should still be obtained under 
these conditions, while any effect due to acquired sensorimotor predictions 
would be absent. 
The recalibration of predictive motor influences on perception after 
incongruent sensorimotor experience is reminiscent of experiments where the 
perceptual influences on action selection and cortical motor activity are 
abolished (Heyes et al., 2005) or reversed (Catmur et al., 2007; 2008) after 
incompatible training. Evidence that sensorimotor experience administered in 
laboratory experiments is sufficient to recalibrate these kinds of sensorimotor 
effects has been taken to support the position that sensorimotor experience ‘in 
the wild’ plays an instructive role in the initial development of the underlying 
mechanisms (Cook et al., 2014). The same reasoning can be applied to 
Experiment 11, suggesting that the predictive effects of action on duration 
perception depend on an initial stage of statistical learning (see Figure 8.1). 
A critic of this line of reasoning may suggest the fact that incongruent 
sensorimotor experience in the lab alters an effect does not imply that 
sensorimotor experience was responsible for establishing the mechanism in the 
first place – for example, matching connections between motor and visual 
representations could be genetically pre-specified as a result of an inherited 
adaptation (Gallese, Rochat, Cossu, & Sinigaglia, 2009; or in other words, that 
the neonate enters the world with a system more like Figure 8.1.b rather than 
8.1.a).   However, such ‘genetic’ alternatives may not be compelling given that 
evolutionary biologists have long stressed the importance of buffering inherited 
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adaptations against environmental changes – if a behavioural trait can be 
altered by changes in the environment, any advantage conveyed by such a trait 
is unreliable and the relevant trait is unlikely to be retained through natural 
selection (Waddington, 1957). Indeed, the fact that the short period of 
experience administered in Experiment 11 was sufficient to disrupt the action-
induced biases suggests that the underlying mechanisms are not buffered 
against environmental influences as is typical for inherited adaptations.  
8.3. Chapter Summary 
Experiment 11 presented evidence that incongruent sensorimotor experience 
can abolish action-induced biases on duration perception described in Chapters 
6 and 7. These results are consistent with the idea that these influences arise 
through a predictive mechanism that tracks the statistical association between 
actions and outcomes.  
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Chapter 9 – General Discussion 
9.1. Thesis summary 
This thesis investigated sensory prediction mechanisms during action, asking 
three questions about the nature of these processes: First, do predictive 
processes during action have a functionally dissociable influence on perceptual 
processing, relative to other prediction mechanisms (functional-specificity)? 
Second, do motor predictions support our ability to process the actions of other 
agents (agent-specificity)? Third, do predictions generated during action 
influence the ‘when’ – as well as the ‘what’ - of perceptual estimates (modality-
specificity)? 
The most influential claims about the functional-specificity of sensory 
prediction during action are made by the Cancellation model (Wolpert et al., 
1995; Bays & Wolpert, 2007) which proposes that perceptual processing of 
expected action outcomes is suppressed. This contrasts with contemporary 
thinking about sensory prediction outside of action contexts, where it is 
typically assume that perception is biased towards more likely outcomes, which 
will facilitate (not suppress) perception of expected events (Yuille & Kersten, 
2006; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). The novel OPPOSE model was outlined 
in Section 1.2.4, alongside its principal prediction that sensory predictions 
during action operate equivalently to those in other contexts. In line with this 
model, Chapters 2-4 presented evidence that participants rate expected action 
outcomes as more intense at early timepoints after action (Experiment 1) and 
that participants are more sensitive to and biased towards reporting the 
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presence of congruent action outcomes when these are presented at threshold 
(Experiment 2). In addition, Experiment 3 found using multivariate analyses of 
fMRI data that congruent action outcomes are associated with higher fidelity 
representations in clusters across the visual cortical hierarchy. All of these 
results are difficult to reconcile with the Cancellation model, but are consistent 
with the predictions of the OPPOSE model. As such, these results undermine 
popular claims about the functional-specificity of sensory prediction during 
action, and instead suggest that expectations generated on the basis of 
movement influence perceptual processing in a similar way to expectations 
established on the basis of other kinds of probabilistic information 
(Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). 
Claims concerning agent-specificity are found in social cognition theories that 
assume predictions generated to support perception of the direct consequences 
of our actions also support perception of imitative reactions performed by other 
agents (Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). An important assumption of these 
theories is that sensorimotor predictions operate across suprasecond delays 
between action and outcome. Chapter 5 reported two experiments which 
revealed that congruent action outcomes were perceived to be more intense 
after substantial suprasecond delays. These results suggest that sensorimotor 
predictions do indeed operate with a temporal profile that could allow them to 
influence perceptual processing of others’ reactions, leading to smoother and 
more fluent social interactions. 
Modality-specificity was considered in Chapters 6-8 by investigating whether 
predictions about the temporal features of action outcomes bias duration 
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perception. These experiments found that duration judgements were strongly 
influenced by the duration of concurrent actions, even when these differences 
in movement duration were generated implicitly. Subsequent chapters 
presented preliminary investigations into the nature of the underlying 
mechanism. Chapter 7 found evidence against biological tuning; suggesting it is 
unlikely that the perceptual biases arise due to a generalisation of sensorimotor 
models used for predicting naturalistic action outcomes (Schubotz, 2007). 
Chapter 8 reported evidence that the action-induced bias can be abolished after 
a short period of incongruent sensorimotor experience. This finding is more 
consistent with the idea that participants acquire general predictive models 
about the relationship between temporal features of their actions and the 
ensuing perceptual consequences through a process of statistical learning. 
In summary, the results of all the experiments reported in this thesis highlight 
the domain-generality of sensory prediction mechanisms in action across a 
range of dimensions, and suggest that prediction operates similarly in action 
and in other contexts. 
9.2. Disentangling perceptual and response biasing 
The majority of the experiments reported in this thesis used psychophysical 
techniques to characterise perceptual biases induced by action. A perennial 
concern in the psychophysical literature is that influences of experimental 
manipulations on perceptual report may reflect response biases rather than 
changes in perceptual appearance (e.g. Carrasco et al., 2004; Schneider & 
Komlos, 2008). Indeed, in a recent paper Firestone and Scholl (2016) suggested 
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that there was weak evidence for any top-down influences on visual perception, 
and that previously reported effects likely reflect changes in later decisional 
processes rather than changes in perception per se. 
In describing the pitfalls of previous work Firestone and Scholl (2016) identify 
conditions where top-down influences are likely to induce response (rather 
than perceptual) biases. For example, they suggest responses biases are likely 
when participants have prior beliefs about how different response options 
relate to different experimental conditions. A number of experiments reported 
in this thesis (e.g. those reporting effects of expectation on perceived brightness 
– Chapters 2 and 5) are not vulnerable to this criticism given that participants 
are unlikely to have preconceived ideas about the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, and a number of experiments 
incorporated controls which made biases to select one response alternative 
orthogonal to the measure of perceptual bias. 
However, the issue of decisional bias is less well-controlled in experiments 
using signal detection measures (Experiment 2). This is because while 
measures of sensitivity in signal detection tasks (e.g. d’) are bias-free, top-down 
influences at the perceptual or decisional locus can both manifest as changes in 
measures of response criterion (e.g. c; Witt, Taylor, Sugovic, & Wixted, (2015).  
For example, Wyart et al., (2012) suggest that expectations generate an additive 
increase in activation at the sensory level – which should inflate hits and false 
alarm rates, leading to a liberal bias– but similar results would be obtained if 
expectations instead alter later decision thresholds in the absence of any 
perceptual effects (Swets et al., 1961).  Wyart and colleagues (2012) address 
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this issue by building a computational model of the sensory and decision stages 
of a putative signal detection process and showing that their results are better 
accommodated by a model which assumes expectations affect sensory activity 
rather than decision thresholds. Similar explicit attempts to model predictive 
effects in the context of action are therefore an important issue to address in 
future work. 
Decisional biases could also in principle be a concern in the experiments which 
reported that duration judgements were biased toward the duration of 
executed actions (Chapters 6-8). However, such an account may be unlikely 
given that effects persist when movement duration is manipulated implicitly, 
and the effect is abolished after incongruent sensorimotor experience (Chapter 
8). If producing (e.g.) longer actions biases participants to respond that a 
concurrent stimulus is (e.g.) longer in the absence of any changes at the 
perceptual level, such a mechanism would continue to generate effects after 
incongruent sensorimotor experience.  
9.3. Are effects of action-outcome congruency effects of expectation? 
The principal aim of this thesis was to investigate the nature of sensory 
prediction mechanisms during action, and to consider whether these effects are 
more consistent with the Cancellation model or with predictive models of 
perception described in the wider sensory cognition literature. This question 
was investigated by comparing perceptual performance and visual brain 
activity as a function of action-outcome congruency, where participants 
produced a particular action (e.g. an index finger movement) and observed 
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either a congruent (e.g. index finger movement) or incongruent outcome (e.g. 
middle finger movement), with both kinds of events occurring with equal 
probability during the experimental task. The logic of these paradigms assumes 
that differences between congruency conditions reflect influences of 
expectation, given that participants will have strong expectations that 
‘congruent’ sensory outcomes will occur after experiencing the statistics of the 
natural environment during development (e.g. where observed index finger 
movements are conditionally more probable after sending the motor command 
to lift an index finger). As noted in Section 1.2.2., congruency manipulations of 
this kind are the predominant way in which expectations are manipulated in the 
action control literature.    
However, this congruency manipulation differs from approaches typically used 
to examine expectations in perceptual tasks by sensory cognition researchers. 
Here, it is more common for observers to be given sensory cues (e.g. tones with 
different frequencies) that provide information about the conditional 
probability of a particular stimulus across the duration of the experiment (e.g. 
gratings with particular orientations, or different directions of dot motion; Kok 
et al., 2012; 2013). It should be noted that this manipulation of within-
experiment probabilities is perhaps the most logical in the sensory cognition 
literature given that it often examines the perception of arbitrary events (e.g., 
gratings) where there would be fewer predictive events prior to any training. 
However, given that probabilistic relationships between actions and outcomes 
are not manipulated in most of the paradigms used here, it is important to 
consider the validity of describing these effects of congruency as ‘predictive’. 
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The ideomotor tradition in action control research has emphasised that 
predictive knowledge about the consequences of our actions is acquired 
through statistical learning (James, 1890), and researchers in this tradition have 
drawn a theoretical equivalence between those action-outcome associations 
that are putatively acquired through typical development (e.g. that lifting a 
finger predicts the observation of a finger lift; Brass, Bekkering & Prinz, 2001) 
and those which are acquired through arbitrary learning procedures 
conceptually similar to those described in contemporary sensory cognition 
research (e.g. where moving a finger generates a high pitched tone; Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001). As such ‘natural’ and artificial congruency effects in reaction 
time tasks are treated as identical phenomena. Indeed, it has been shown that 
laboratory learning procedures can reconfigure ‘natural’ congruency effects 
observed in automatic imitation tasks (see Section 8.1) and that the learning 
mechanisms responsible for this reconfiguration are sensitive to the statistical 
contingency between actions and outcomes (Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 
2010) in much the same way that arbitrarily acquired action-outcome 
associations are contingency-sensitive (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Additionally, 
in the present thesis Experiment 11 revealed that action-induced perceptual 
effects can be reconfigured by sensorimotor experience, suggesting that the 
underlying mechanisms track statistical relationships between actions and 
outcomes, a cardinal feature of prediction (Shea, 2015).  
As such, it seems reasonable to assume that effects of action-outcome 
congruency do indeed reflect influences of a predictive mechanism. However, it 
may be advantageous in future work to investigate whether similar effects on 
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perceptual processing are obtained in tasks where participants experience 
novel associations between actions and arbitrary outcomes in the lab, as these 
would provide strong controls against other forms of top-down influence that 
could influence perceptual processing (e.g. conceptual relationships between 
actions and outcomes; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008) and would permit even 
more informed comparison with tasks used in the sensory cognition literature 
(Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). 
9.4. Relationships between attention and expectation 
Summerfield and Egner (2009; 2016) have proposed that top-down effects of 
expectation (driven by stimulus probability) should be carefully distinguished 
from top-down effects of attention (driven by the relevance of stimulus to a 
participant’s current task). Such dissociations are important given that both 
kinds of information may be redundant in many settings (e.g. things that are 
likely are also often relevant). Indeed, this conflation is found in classic 
‘attentional’ paradigms – such as the Posner task (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 
1980) –where participants are given probabilistic cues about target locations 
and manipulations are thought to reflect attentional processes. Similarly, 
Summerfield and Egner (2016) have proposed that experiments reporting 
detection benefits after valid probabilistic cues to stimulus identity (e.g. Stein & 
Peelen, 2015) could be explained by attentional – rather than predictive – 
weighting of cued features.  
The experiments reported in this thesis chiefly manipulated expectations via 
action-outcome congruency (see Section 9.3 above), but largely did not 
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explicitly manipulate task-relevance (with the exception of Experiment 3). 
However, across these paradigms congruent and incongruent stimuli were 
equally task-relevant, and similar effects of congruency on visual brain activity 
were obtained irrespective of task-relevance (Experiment 3).   Nonetheless, 
orthogonally manipulating task-relevance alongside stimulus probability (e.g. 
Wyart et al., 2012) would provide the most powerful way of determining the 
contribution (if any) of top-down attentional mechanisms to these effects, and 
this presents an important avenue for future work. 
9.5. Relationship to effects of action on tactile perception 
Predictive influences of action on perception were investigated in this thesis 
using visual and auditory paradigms. The results obtained across these 
experiments suggested that predictions generated during action have a 
generally facilitatory effect on perceptual processing, in contrast with the 
predictions of the Cancellation model. While researchers interested in the 
Cancellation account have proposed that the predictions should operate 
equivalently across all sensory modalities (Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, & 
Friston, 2013; Wolpert et al., 2003), some of the most high-profile evidence for 
this account has been drawn from the tactile domain. For example, considerable 
empirical and theoretical attention has been paid to the force-tapping task, 
where participants perceive forces applied to the palm of their hand after 
tapping a lever as less intense than equivalent forces applied in the absence of 
movement (Bays et al., 2005). The experiments reported in this thesis have not 
used tactile tasks and evidence of action-induced facilitation in visual or 
auditory domains does not imply identical effects will be obtained in touch. 
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However, it is important to recognise that investigating predictive influences of 
action on tactile perception is likely complicated by the occurrence of sensory 
suppression (Chapman, 1994). A number of studies have revealed general 
decrements in tactile sensitivity during action execution (Chapman & 
Beauchamp, 2006), which is likely mediated by mechanisms operating at the 
level of spinal cord (Seki & Fetz, 2012). The mechanisms underlying sensory 
suppression effects are not sensitive to predictive relationships between 
actions and outcomes – for example, Juravle and Spence (2011) report that 
participants are poorer at detecting gaps in ongoing vibration applied to the 
wrist when they are juggling, but gaps in vibration are not a probable 
consequence of juggling.  
The existence of sensory suppression mechanisms complicates the 
interpretation of cancellation effects in tasks which compare perception of 
tactile stimuli during active movement and passive stimulation, even when the 
stimuli used resemble naturalistic action outcomes (Bays et al., 2005).  In these 
studies, the underlying logic is that participants will not engage predictive 
mechanisms during passive stimulation and therefore comparison of this 
condition to active movement reveals influences of prediction. However, these 
two conditions also differ in the degree to which they recruit non-predictive 
sensory suppression mechanisms (Chapman & Beauchamp, 2006) and it is 
therefore plausible that cancellation effects reported in these tasks are not 
effects of prediction. 
This confound could be addressed by adopting conceptually similar paradigms 
to those reported in this thesis where participants typically produce an action 
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on every trial and either experience a congruent or incongruent tactile outcome. 
While congruency conditions differ in how they will be influenced by an 
identity-specific prediction process, these conditions would be influenced 
equally by non-specific sensory suppression.   
9.6. Conclusion 
This thesis has presented evidence that sensory predictions generated during 
action shape perceptual processing. The results are consistent with a model 
wherein expectations generated on the basis of action influence perception in 
an equivalent way to other forms of predictive signal. 
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